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My dissertation addresses the questions 1) what cues children and adults have in their 
cuebox (i.e., the set of cues available for making inferences or categorizing), 2) how people’s 
intuition about the importance of the cues drives their information search, and 3) how the 
framing of a problem and the experimental design influence these intuitions. A first project 
investigated developmental differences in how children and adults solve a sequential binary 
categorization task. Results show that, apart from age-related differences, children’s but not 
adults’ inquiry strategies improve if objects are represented at the basic level (e.g., dog) but 
not if represented at the subordinate level (e.g., Dalmatian) or when the basic level is 
specified by additional features (e.g., dog, kennel, to wag, collar). Explanations are that, 
unlike other representations, basic level objects trigger features that are useful for 
categorization, and therefore help children ask more effective questions. A second project 
tested children and young adults on two inference problems, by manipulating whether cues 
were generated or given. Results show that, only when generating their own cues, younger 
children matched or even outperformed the accuracy of older children and young adults, by 
generating cues that were as informative as the those generated by older children and young 
adults. A third project examined the type, amount and informativeness of the cues in 
people’s cuebox. Further, it investigated the influence of the type of cues on the ability of 
children and young adults to generate or select the most informative cue available. Results 
show that children’s cuebox contains more perceptual cues than young adults’. We found no 
difference between the two age groups in terms of informativeness of the cues generated. 
Young adults showed the tendency to systematically consider non-perceptual cues more 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Die Dissertation untersucht 1) welche Cues Kinder und Erwachsene in ihrer Cuebox 
haben, d.h. welche Cues für Inferenzen herangezogen wird, 2) wie Intuition über die 
Wichtigkeit von Cues die Informationssuche beeinflusst, und 3) wie das Framing eines 
Problems und das experimentelle Design die Intuition beeinflussen. Das erste Projekt 
untersucht den Effekt verschiedener Domänen und Objektrepräsentationen auf 
Erfragungsstrategien von Kindern und Erwachsenen in einer Kategorisierungsaufgabe. 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine Basis-Level-Repräsentation (z.B. Hund) das Generieren von 
höher geordneten Merkmalen, welche die Objekte innerhalb einer übergeordneten Kategorie 
unterscheiden, für Kinder erleichtern und dadurch benutzt werden können, um effektive 
Fragen zu stellen. Dieser Effekt wurde nicht gefunden, wenn Kinder nicht selbst solche 
Merkmale generierten, sondern aus einem vordefinierten Set auswählen mussten. Das zweite 
Projekt untersuchte Kinder und junge Erwachsene bezüglich zweier Inferenzprobleme. In 
einer Bedingung mussten Cues selbst generiert werden, in einer anderen wurde ein Set von 
Cues vorgegeben. Ergebnisse zeigen, dass nur, wenn Cue selbst generiert wurden, junge 
Kinder gleich gut oder besser als ältere Kinder oder Erwachsene abschnitten, da sie Cues 
generierten, die ebenso informativ waren wie die der anderen beiden Altersgruppen. In dem 
dritten Projekt wurde getestet, wie die Art, Anzahl und Qualität der Cues die Fähigkeit von 
Kindern und jungen Erwachsenen beeinflusst, die informativsten Cues zu generieren bzw. 
auszuwählen. Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Cuebox von Kindern mehr perzeptuelle Cues 
beinhaltet als jene junger Erwachsener. Dennoch war der Informationsgehalt der generierten 
Cues in beiden Gruppen gleich. Junge Erwachsene zeigten die Tendenz, nicht-perzeptuelle 
Cues  systematisch als informativer zu erachten als perzeptuelle Cues. Kinder zeigten die 
gleiche Tendenz nur dann, wenn sie aus einem vordefinierten Set auswählen mussten. 











And, of course, Alla mia mamma 
 
 
The most interesting information comes from children, 
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My research is deeply rooted into the approach of the Adaptive Behavior and 
Cognition (ABC) group of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, where I have 
been working for the last three years. In particular, my investigation is embedded in the 
bounded and ecological rationality frameworks. From these programs my investigation 
inherits a distinctive definition of concepts such as cues, domain, heuristics and adaptive 
toolbox of strategies and the focus on the process more than on the outcome. Above all, my 
work shares the understanding of rationality as a match between the mental abilities of a 
subject and the structure of the environment in which the subject acts (Gigerenzer, Todd and 
the ABC Research Group, 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007; Todd, Gigerenzer and the ABC 
Research Group, 2012). These are the two blades of a pair of scissors, as described 
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metaphorically by Herbert Simon (1991). This view of rationality implies that human minds, 
with limited cognitive and computational resources, can be successful by exploiting pre-
existing structure and regularity in the environment. It also suggests that strategies, and the 
pieces of information (i.e., cues) they are often based on, are not good or bad a priori. As 
tools in a toolbox, no strategy or cue is suitable for all problems, because different tasks 
require different tools.  
Little is known about how the individual adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer & Selten, 
2001; Gigerenzer et al., 1999) changes over the lifespan (Gigerenzer, 2003; Mata, Schooler, 
& Rieskamp, 2007; Mata, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011; Todd et al., 2012), and even 
less–if anything–is known about how the cuebox develops across the life span. By cuebox I 
mean the set of the cues, information, features and concepts available for making inferences, 
for categorizing, for interpreting every real world experience, for coming up with 
explanations, and for building hypotheses. 
My dissertation aims at filling this gap by investigating the development of intuitions 
about the importance of real cues in the real world. Do children and adults search and focus 
on the most effective piece of information when making inferences or categorizing? 
Specifically, my thesis addresses the following questions: 1) what type of cues children and 
adults have in their cuebox, 2) how people’s intuition about the importance of the cues drives 
their information search and inquiring strategies, therefore constraining their inferences and 
decisions, and 3) how the framing of a problem and the experimental design influence these 
intuitions, sometimes boosting or limiting our information search strategies. 
These questions spring from my experience with children at school, when leading 
workshops of creative theatre, and as a scout leader. Children ask thousands of questions 
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about everything. They ask questions to obtain answers, and this is not trivial: There is a 
concrete intention underlying their inquiring behavior, intended to search and collect the 
information needed to fill a gap in their knowledge, to disambiguate an unclear or surprising 
situation or to resolve some detected inconsistency (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik, 
Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 1999; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Piaget, 1954; for models explaining and 
predicting question asking in the adults literature, see Graesser and McMahen, 1993; 
Graesser and Olde, 2003). Children need questions to move their knowledge structures closer 
to adults-like states (Chouinard, 2007). For this reason, they sometimes ask questions we 
adults would have never asked, and seem to pay attention to different layers of things, often 
not overlapping with the information we consider relevant. Though, I realized that their 
questions are sometimes very insightful and, above all, effective. I was curious to test this 
intuition, to investigate the conditions under which children can ask effective questions and 
to compare their performances with the adult’s ones. I always thought this is how research 
should work: Back to the basics. Observe the world, investigate what you find intriguing, and 
try to solve the puzzle (Bodemer & Ruggeri, 2012).  
I believe that the problems we find interesting and relevant should be shaping our 
methodologies. I learned that the choice of the methodological tool has to be driven by the 
research question, and not the other way around. In particular, how can we possibly study the 
contents and the development of our cuebox (in terms of number, type and quality of the cues 
people have available for different inferences) by implementing the traditionally used cue-
selection design, where participants are provided a set of cues they can select among (see 
Chapter 4)? Moreover, this design might not be suitable to investigate children’s decision-
making, although successfully used for studying adults’ cue-based inferences (see Chapter 3). 
First, it requires the children to assess and compare the usefulness of exogenously given cues 
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they might not be familiar with, or the meaning of which they might not know (such as 
horsepower, see Mata et al., 2011). Second, a set of cues to choose from is a necessarily 
constrained selection that might not include all the information one consider useful. 
In Chapter 2, 3 and 4, I applied a method of “open questioning”: I did not provide 
participants with a limited set of cues, but instead prompted them to generate their own cues, 
by letting them ask anything they wanted about the objects they had to make inferences or 
decisions about. This methodology, to my knowledge, has never been used for studying cue-
based decision-making. It is inspired by the early developmental studies that analyze the 
questions children spontaneously ask in their everyday life (Callanan and Oakes, 1992; 
Piaget, 1926; Sully, 1896), and by the experimental research focusing on the linguistic 
development of children’s ability to form questions (Solè Planas, 1995), and on how 
acquiring information with questions supports the building and expansion of the child’s 
conceptual structures and knowledge (Chouinard, 2007; Harris, 2000; Vosniadou, 1994). 
In Chapter 2, my coauthor and I investigated developmental differences in how 
children and adults solve a sequential binary categorization task. We used a computerized 
version of the Twenty Question game, which entails guessing a target object by ruling out the 
alternatives with yes/no questions. We ran three experiments to replicate and extend prior 
work showing that, apart from age-related differences, children’s but not adults’ inquiry 
strategies improve if objects are represented at the basic level (e.g., dog) but not if 
represented at the subordinate level (e.g., Dalmatian) or when the basic level is specified by 
additional features (e.g., dog, kennel, to wag, collar). Possible explanations are that, unlike 
other representations, basic level objects (a) trigger features that are useful for categorization, 
and (b) help children ask more effective questions. To test (a), we ran Study 2 and found that 
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in both children and adults basic-level objects tend to trigger features that help to distinguish 
among groups of objects (e.g., does it have four legs) rather than object-specific features 
(e.g., does it bark), which are less suited for efficient categorization. To disentangle (a) and 
(b), we ran Study 3 and found that, if children do not generate but select questions from a 
given set, object representations have no effect on categorization performance. This suggests 
that object representations trigger features more or less suited for categorization but do not 
“teach” participants to identify more effective questions, an ability that remains tied to 
cognitive development.  
In Chapter 3 we addressed the following question: Are children capable of focusing 
on the most informative cues? Previous research on cue-based inference suggests 
contradicting answers that we think are derived from the experimental design. We 
hypothesized that providing participants with a fixed set of cues to choose from handicaps 
children because it requires assessing and comparing the informativeness of exogenously 
given cues that they might not be familiar with or would not have generated themselves. We 
tested second-, third-, and fifth-grade children, and young adults on inference problems 
(which of two real cars is more expensive and which of two real cities has more inhabitants), 
manipulating whether cues were generated or given. Results show that younger children 
matched older children and young adults in accuracy, or even outperformed them, only when 
participants generated their own cues. Younger children did so by generating cues that were 
as informative as those generated by older children and young adults.  
In Chapter 4 I followed up this line of research. We attempted to open and compare 
children’s and young adults’ cuebox by examining the type, amount and informativeness of 
the cues they have available to make different kinds of inferences. We explore the 
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importance of cues beyond content free representations, by examining the cues participants 
generate for a range of everyday inference tasks. Further, we investigate how objective 
informativeness of a cue and type of cue determine children’s and young adult’s ability to 
generate the most informative cue in their cuebox and to select the most informative between 
two given cues. Results show that children’s cuebox contains more perceptual cues than 
young adults’. However, we found no difference between the two age groups in terms of 
informativeness of the cues generated. Young adults showed the tendency to systematically 
consider non-perceptual cues more informative than visible cues, whereas children showed 
the same tendency only in a cue-selection task.  
In Chapter 5, finally, I summarized the previous chapters, drawing the general 
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Is Children’s and Adults’ Categorization 
Performance Dependent On Object 
Representation? 
Ruggeri, A. and Feufel, M. A.  
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates developmental differences in how children and adults solve a 
sequential binary categorization task - the Twenty Questions game - which entails guessing a 
target from a fixed set of objects by ruling out alternatives with yes/no questions. We ran 
three experiments to replicate and extend prior work showing that, apart from age-related 
differences, children’s but not adults’ inquiry strategies improve if objects are represented at 
the basic level (e.g., dog) but not if represented at the subordinate level (e.g., Dalmatian) or 
when the basic level is specified by additional features (e.g., dog, kennel, to wag, collar). 
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Possible xplanations are that, unlike other representations, basic level objects (a) trigger 
features that are useful for categorization, and (b) help children identifying more effective 
questions. To test (a), we ran Study 2 and found that in both children and adults basic-level 
objects trigger features that help to distinguish among groups of objects (e.g., does it have 
four legs) rather than object-specific features (e.g., does it bark), which are less suited for 
efficient categorization. To disentangle (a) and (b), we ran Study 3 and found that, if children 
do not generate but select questions from a given set, object representations have no effect on 
categorization performance. This suggests that object representations trigger features more or 
less suited for categorization but do not help participants to identify more effective questions, 
an ability that remains tied to cognitive development. 
Introduction 
In 1911, to be awarded the First Class Boy Scout badge, boys needed to be able to 
identify “from observation six species of wild birds by their plumage, notes, tracks, or habits” 
(Boy Scouts of America, 1911, p. 55). For preparation, the Boy Scouts Handbook instructed 
boys to “notice the ‘range’ of birds in your reference book, and eliminate all those not stated 
as occurring in your present territory. Notice too, dates of the birds’ coming and going, and 
do not expect to find species at any other time of year than within the dates mentioned. By 
thus narrowing down the possibilities the task is much simplified” (p. 87). Moreover, the 
handbook suggested looking for “a match in your reference book by first examining the size 
of the bird (for example smaller than wren or larger than crow), then the location where the 
bird is observed (near ground or high up), then the color” (p. 88). This is an example of a fast 
and frugal tree, a proposed method for modeling object categorization (Berretty, Todd, & 
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Blythe, 1997; Berretty, Todd, & Martignon, 1999; Martignon, Katsikopoulos, & Woike, 
2012). 
Formally, this and many other tasks we solve every day are identical. They are 
sequential binary categorization tasks that can be solved by asking binary yes/no questions 
(e.g., Is the bird high up?) aimed at categorizing objects as target or nontarget. However, this 
shared formal structure is often concealed by the domain specificity of objects (objects can 
be, for example, birds, diseases, or phones) and different levels of abstraction (e.g., 
distinguishing a bird from other animals or a wren from other birds). We investigated 
developmental differences in how children and adults solve a sequential binary categorization 
task, depending on object domain and representation. 
The Twenty Questions Game 
The development of inquiry strategies in sequential binary categorization tasks has 
been studied using versions of the Twenty Questions game. This game involves two players, 
one who asks questions and one who knows and gives the answers to the questions. 
Specifically, the player asking questions has to guess which object the other player is 
thinking of. Only yes/no questions are allowed. In its experimental version, participants are 
presented with a fixed number of objects and their task is to identify the object the 
experimenter has selected from the set by asking as few questions as possible (see Denney & 
Denney, 1973; Herwig, 1982; Mosher & Hornsby, 1966; Siegler, 1977; Van Horn & Bartz, 
1968). Overall, experimental results show that (a) younger children, as well as elderly people, 
need more questions to identify the target object, and (b) the inquiry strategies’ effectiveness 
in ruling out nontarget objects improves with age and declines in old age. That is, younger 
children and elderly people ask almost exclusively questions concerning particular objects 
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(i.e., so-called hypothesis-scanning questions, such as “Is it the dog?”), whereas older 
children and adults ask more questions about features of the objects that help rule out more 
than one object at a time (i.e., so-called constraint-seeking questions, such as “Does the 
animal fly?”). The observed transitions are explained as a shift from a perceptual focus on 
individual stimuli to a tendency to recognize higher order features that can be used to group 
and cluster similar objects into categories (e.g., flying animals versus nonflying animals) and, 
by this, to guide inquiry strategies (Mosher & Hornsby, 1966).  
A Matter of Representation 
 The representation of a problem influences performance. For example, it can 
potentially distract people (Gerofsky, 1996) and lead them to deviate from norms of formal 
logic (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). But the representation of a problem may also 
facilitate logical reasoning. For instance, certain representations of statistical concepts, such 
as natural frequencies (Zhu & Gigerenzer, 2006), tinker cubes1 (Martignon & Krauss, 2009), 
and icon arrays (Multmeier, Gigerenzer, & Wegwarth, 2012) have been shown to facilitate 
probabilistic reasoning and inferences in children.  
With respect to categorization of objects, Rosch and colleagues found that 
preschoolers matched adults’ in classifying objects into basic-level categories such as shoes, 
chairs, and cars but not yet into superordinate categories such as clothes, furniture, or 
vehicles (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Indeed, research has shown 
that objects represented at the basic level are first named and understood by children because 
																																																								
	
1 Tinker cubes are small plastic cubes of different colors that can be assembled to form towers that encode 
information about one individual in a population. 
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they mirror natural kinds and the organization of our knowledge (Rosch, 1978) and 
emphasize information about the structures, functions, and perceptual characteristics of 
individual objects (Wisniewski & Murphy, 1989).  
Taking Rosch et al.’s (1976) results into account, Herwig (1982) tested preschoolers, 
first, second, and fifth graders on the Twenty Questions game. Herwig hypothesized that 
categorization performance would be best when children are given objects represented at the 
subordinate level (e.g., sportscar, van, raincoat, jacket) because they are familiar with 
features that differentiate the basic-level categories to which those objects belong (e.g., cars 
and coats). These higher order features are necessary to ask effective questions in the Twenty 
Questions game. When given objects represented at the basic level (e.g., car and coat), they 
should perform worse because children are less familiar with features that differentiate 
between superordinate categories to which those objects belong (e.g., vehicles and clothes). 
Indeed, children’s performance in the Twenty Questions game improved when given 
subordinate-level objects, but only if they had the chance to group the objects into categories 
before starting the game. Without training, in contrast, children’s performance was best when 
objects were represented at the basic level. This suggests that basic-level objects help 
children come up with higher order features that lead them to ask more effective questions in 
the Twenty Questions game, without requiring prior training. We sought to replicate and 
explain the facilitating effect of basic-level objects on categorization performance. 
Study 1 
To test the robustness of Herwig’s (1982) findings, we investigated developmental 
trends in inquiry strategies by manipulating a) the level of abstraction used to represent 
objects in a computerized version of the Twenty Questions game. We extended earlier 
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findings by (b) providing objects from only one rather than several superordinate categories 
(i.e., object domains) and (c) comparing the performance of second and fifth graders with 
adults. 
With respect to the level of abstraction used to represent the objects, we created three 
different conditions, where objects were represented at (a) the basic level (e.g., dog or 
doctor), (b) the subordinate level (e.g., Dalmatian or dentist), and (c) the basic level enriched 
by three features (e.g., for a dog the three features were kennel, wags, collar). We will refer 
to this condition as the feature-enriched condition. Given Herwig’s (1982) results, we 
expected objects represented at the basic level to facilitate categorization performance and 
we hypothesized the other two conditions would hinder participants’ performance. Objects 
represented at the subordinate level are taxonomically less general than basic-level objects 
and imply additional features. Similarly, in the feature-enriched condition there are also three 
additional features, only here they are given and not implicit. We hypothesized that these 
features would hinder categorization performance because they are object specific and 
distract from identifying higher order features that help to differentiate between the objects.  
With respect to the domain or superordinate category from which objects were drawn, 
we presented, unlike in Herwig’s study, objects from one of two superordinate categories 
only: animals or professions. There are two reasons for this decision. First, we decided 
against including objects from multiple superordinate categories (e.g., vehicles and clothes) 
to reduce the number of differentiating features. We contend that this is a stronger test of the 
facilitating effect of basic-level objects. Second, we chose these particular domains because 
children and adults likely differ in how familiar they are with animals, professions, and their 
differentiating features. Children, in contrast to adults, naturally focus on perceptual features 
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of objects (Flavell, 1985; John & Sujan, 1990; Springer, 2001; Wartella, 1979), and animals’ 
morphological features, learned in school, are often sufficient to differentiate between them. 
Differences among professions, on the other hand, are less perceptual in nature and are 
mainly learned later in life. Thus, with respect to object domains, we expected a decline in 
performance for children asked to categorize professions, but not for adults.  
With respect to developmental differences in general, we expected, based on previous 
research (e.g., Mosher & Hornsby, 1966), that adults would perform better than older 
children, and older children better than younger children, both in terms of the number and 
effectiveness of their questions. We also hypothesized the facilitating effect of the basic-level 
and hindering effects of the subordinate and feature-enriched conditions to be stronger for 
children than for adults. Adults are more familiar with differentiating features and should be 
less impacted by the facilitating effects of basic-level objects as well as the distraction effect 
due to object-specific features. 
Method 
Participants. We tested 30 second-grade children (17 females, Mage = 7.3 years; SD = 
0.7), 24 fifth-grade children (12 females, Mage = 9.4 years; SD = 0.5), and 20 adults (9 
females, Mage = 28.2 years; SD = 2). All children were recruited from the Istituto Sacro Cuore 
primary school in Livorno, Italy. Adult participants were recruited from the University of 
Pisa, Italy. 
Design and procedure. We asked participants to play three rounds of the Twenty 
Questions game. In each round, they were presented with 20 cards displayed on a computer 
screen, each consisting of one or more words that represented an object. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions: The basic-level, subordinate-
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level or feature-enriched condition. The objects were taken from either the animals or the 
professions domain and remained the same for the three rounds. All objects presented to 
participants are listed in the Appendix, sorted by condition and domain.  
The computer randomly selected one from the set of 20 objects. Participants had to 
ask the experimenter yes/no questions to identify this object. Open questions such as “What 
kind of food does the animal eat?” were not answered or considered in the analyses. After 
answering a yes/no question, the experimenter crossed out those objects the answer ruled out. 
The eliminated objects turned darker on the screen to help participants focus on the 
remaining objects. A round was over when only one object was left or the target object was 
identified.  
Participants were given 60 points at the outset and had to pay 1 point for each 
question they asked. Participants were given 5 points for identifying the target object. The 
score was continually updated and appeared in the upper right corner of the screen. 
Participants were told that the three players with the highest score would be awarded a box of 
colored pencils (children) or a 20-euro Amazon gift card (adults).  
Dependent measures. Results were analyzed with respect to developmental 
differences on three outcomes: (1) the number of questions needed to reach the solution; (2) 
their effectiveness, measured in terms of the information gain of the questions asked; and (3) 
the type of questions asked. We will explain Outcomes 2 and 3 in turn.  
Following previous research on the Twenty Questions game (Nelson, Divjak, 
Martignon, Gudmundsdottir, & Meder, 2012), we used information gain to measure the 
effectiveness of the questions asked (see also Nelson, 2005; Oaksford, & Chater, 1994; 
Oaksford, & Chater, 1996). As defined within the framework of information theory, 
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information gain (Lindley, 1956) refers to the expected reduction of entropy (Shannon, 
1948). Imagine 15 animals and the question “Can this animal fly?” that splits the 15 objects 
into 5 flying and 10 nonflying animals. To measure its information gain I, we subtract the 
posterior from the prior entropy. The prior entropy for 15 objects Hprior = log2(15) = 3.91. If 
the target animal is a bird, then the posterior entropy Hfly = log2(5) = 2.32; if not, Hnot fly = 
log2(10) = 3.32. Thus, on average the posterior entropy Hposterior = (5/15 * 2.32) + (10/15 * 
3.32) = 2.98, and the question’s information gain I = Hprior – Hposterior = 3.91 – 2.98 = 0.93. 
According to this measure, the maximum information gain of a question is 1.0, obtained by a 
question that splits the remaining objects in half. 
 Regarding Outcome 3, we followed the previous literature (Denney & Denney, 1973; 
Herwig, 1982; Mosher & Hornsby, 1966) and coded the questions as hypothesis scanning 
(i.e., questions concerning particular objects, as in “Is it the dog?”), constraint seeking (i.e., 
questions concerning features useful for splitting the remaining objects, as in “Does it have 
four legs?”), or pseudoconstraint seeking (i.e., questions concerning features related to only 
one object, as in “Does it bark?”). Of course, the three types of outcomes are correlated. In 
particular, both hypothesis-scanning and pseudoconstraint-seeking questions yield lower 
information gain than constraint-seeking questions so that, on average, inquiry strategies 
based on the former would require more questions to reach the solution.  
Results 
For each dependent measure, we ran a repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with the results of three Twenty Question games as the within-subject factor and 
age group, representation, and object domain as between-subjects variables. In general, we 
found no significant within-subject effects, that is, no learning during the three rounds. 
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Number of questions. As expected, we found a main effect for age group, F(2,56) = 
10.15, p < .001, 2 = .27, with post hoc analyses showing that adults needed fewer questions 
to reach the solution (Madults = 4.4; SD = 1) than children (Myounger_children = 7.3; SD = 4.4; 
Molder_children = 6; SD = 3.1). Although we found no main effect or interactions for object 
domain or representation, children seemed to be more sensitive to representation than adults, 













Figure 1. Number of questions needed to reach the solution, by domain 
(animals, professions) and condition (basic level, subordinate level, and 
feature enriched). Error bars indicate standard errors. 
 
For both animals and professions, younger and older children tended to need fewer 
questions in the basic-level condition (Myounger_children = 6.8; SD = 3.7; Molder_children = 5; SD = 
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2.7) compared to the feature-enriched (Myounger_children = 7.6; SD = 4.5; Molder_children = 6.6; SD 
= 3.5) and subordinate-level (Myounger_children = 8.2; SD = 5.2; Molder_children = 6; SD = 2.8) 
conditions 
Information gain. As for the number of questions, we found a main effect for age 
group, F(2,56) = 45.6, p < .001, 2 = .62. Post hoc analyses confirmed developmental 
differences in terms of information gain. Adults asked questions with higher information gain 
(Madults = 0.9; SD = 0.09) than older children (Molder_children = 0.68; SD = 0.17) and older 
children asked questions with higher information gain than younger children (Myounger_children 
= 0.52; SD = 0.22).  
Figure 2. Average quality of participants’ questions (in terms of information 
gain), by domain (animals, professions) and condition (basic level, 
subordinate level, and feature enriched). Error bars indicate standard errors. 
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We also found a main effect of object domain, F(1,56) = 10.7, p = .002, 2 = .16, 
with participants asking questions with higher information gain in the animals than in the 
professions domain (Manimals = 0.74; SD = 0.21; Mprofessions = 0.61; SD = 0.25). For this reason, 
in Figure 2 we display information gain separately for the two domains.  
Moreover, the analysis revealed a main effect of representation, F(2,56) = 5.1, p = 
.009, 2 = .15. Post hoc analyses confirmed the facilitating effect of basic-level objects in that 
participants asked questions with higher information gain when objects were represented at 
the basic level (Mbasic-level = 0.73; SD = 0.22) compared to the feature-enriched (Mfeature-enriched 
= 0.63; SD = 0.21) or subordinate-level (Msubordinate-level = 0.67; SD = 0.27) conditions. We did 
not find any interaction effects. Similar to results obtained in terms of the number of 
questions asked, results indicate that children tended to be more sensitive to representation 
than adults (Figure 2). 
Question type. Figure 3 shows the percentage of the type of questions asked by 
domain and condition. A repeated-measures ANOVA with the proportion of constraint-
seeking questions of all the questions asked as dependent variable found main effects for all 
between-subjects variables, that is, age group, F(2,56) = 28, p < .001, 2 = .5, representation, 
F(2,56) = 3.4, p = .041, 2 = .11, and domain, F(1,56) = 10.6, p = .002, 2 = .16. Post hoc 
analyses of the main effect of age group confirmed earlier research in that adults asked a 
higher proportion of constraint-seeking questions (70%; SD = 22%) than older children 
(46%; SD = 28%), who asked a higher proportion of constraint-seeking questions than 
younger children (29%; SD = 29%). The main effect of object domain showed that 
participants would more readily generate constraint-seeking questions in the animals domain 
(56%; SD = 29%) than in the professions domain (36%; SD = 33%). Finally, post hoc 
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analyses of the main effect for representation confirmed our hypothesis that participants 
would generate a higher proportion of constraint-seeking questions in the basic-level 
condition (54%; SD = 31%) than in the feature-enriched (41%; SD = 31%) and subordinate-
level (43%; SD = 33%) conditions.  
 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants’ questions by question type (hypothesis scanning, constraint 
seeking, and pseudoconstraint seeking), by domain (animals, professions) and condition (basic level, 
subordinate level, and feature enriched). 
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The same repeated-measures ANOVA with the proportion of hypothesis-scanning 
questions of all the questions asked as dependent variable revealed a main effect of age 
group, F(2,56) = 15.2, p < .001, 2 = .35. The analysis revealed no other main effects but we 
did find an interaction effect of age group and representation, F(4,56) = 3.4, p = .014, 2 = .2. 
Post hoc analyses showed that younger children asked the lowest proportion of hypothesis-
seeking questions in the basic-level condition (28%; SD = 27%) compared to the feature-
enriched (54%; SD = 40%) and subordinate-level (78%; SD = 38%) conditions.  
We also ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with the proportion of pseudoconstraint-
seeking questions of all the questions asked as dependent variable and found a main effect of 
age group, F(2,56) = 17, p < .001, 2 = .38, with post hoc analyses showing that older 
children (35%; SD = 27%) asked a higher proportion of pseudoconstraint-seeking questions 
than younger children (20%; SD = 20%), who asked a higher proportion of pseudoconstraint-
seeking questions than adults (0%; SD = 0%).  
Discussion 
As hypothesized, objects represented at the basic level facilitated children’s but not 
adults’ categorization performance. When given basic-level objects, children needed fewer 
questions to reach the solution, asked more informative questions, and came up with a higher 
proportion of constraint-seeking questions. Results suggest that basic-level objects trigger 
children’s knowledge about higher order features that help them differentiate between the 
objects. In contrast, in the subordinate-level and feature-enriched conditions children may 
have been distracted by the implied/given features that were specific to the objects. Indeed, 
these features were not useful for differentiating between the objects within the same 
superordinate category. 
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In terms of the effect of object domain, the results suggest that the professions domain 
was more difficult to categorize than the animals domain for both children and adults.  
From a developmental point of view, the performance pattern we identified confirmed 
previous findings for the Twenty Questions game (e.g., Denney & Denney, 1973; Herwig, 
1982; Mosher & Hornsby, 1966; Siegler, 1977; Van Horn & Bartz, 1968). First, the number 
of questions decreased and information gain increased with participant age. Second, the 
number of constraint-seeking questions increased linearly from younger to older children to 
adults. Third, younger children generated the most hypothesis-scanning questions, whereas 
older children asked the most pseudoconstraint-seeking questions. This developmental 
difference was particularly strong in the more difficult professions domain and in the 
subordinate-level and feature-enriched conditions. Interesting from a developmental 
perspective, adults never asked pseudoconstraint-seeking questions. This finding suggests 
that older children stopped relying on the hypothesis-seeking strategy but did not yet have the 
necessary knowledge or skills to ask constraint-seeking questions (see also Mosher & 
Hornsby, 1963). Thus, they resorted to pseudoconstraint-seeking questions, which might look 
more like what adults would ask but are in fact only as effective as hypothesis-scanning 
questions.  
In summary, results of Study 1 show that the skills necessary for applying the more 
efficient constraint-seeking strategy are bound to age-related cognitive differences. However, 
they also suggest that the facilitating effect of basic-level objects is due to the type of features 
this level of representation triggers. In the second study, we sought to test the hypothesis that 
basic-level objects trigger more higher order features than subordinate and feature-enriched 
objects.  
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Study 2 
To test the hypothesis that basic-level objects trigger more higher-order features than 
subordinate or feature-enriched objects, we asked second graders, fifth graders, and adults to 
generate as many features as they could think of to differentiate a given object (e.g., dog or 
doctor) from any other object in the same superordinate category (i.e., animals or 
professions). Assuming developmental differences in general knowledge about the given 
objects, we expected adults to be able to generate more features than older children, and older 
children to list more features than younger children.  
With respect to the effect of representation, we expected the types of features 
triggered by the representations to differ qualitatively. We hypothesized that participants in 
the basic-level condition would tend to generate more higher order features (e.g., “Dogs have 
four legs” and “Doctors have a degree”). When given objects represented at the subordinate 
level, participants would generate more features that were specific to the particular animal 
(e.g., “Dalmatians have black and white spots”) or profession (e.g., “A dentist fixes teeth”), 
rather than higher order features (e.g., “Dalmatians have four legs” or “Dentists have a 
degree”). In the feature-enriched condition participants would generate features that were 
similar to the three provided, so again specific to the particular animal or profession. 
Moreover, the findings of Study 1 led us to expect participants to generate more higher order 
features when given objects from the animals than the professions domain. 
Unlike object specific features, higher order features are not unique to the particular 
object given but apply to multiple objects in the superordinate category (i.e., to other animals 
or professions). These features can therefore be used for asking constraint-seeking questions 
that rule out multiple objects at a time to quickly converge on the target object.  
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Method 
Participants. We tested 43 second-grade children (21 females, Mage = 7.5 years; SD = 
0.5), 60 fifth-grade children (23 females, Mage = 9.8 years; SD = 0.6), and 33 adults (15 
females, Mage = 25.5 years; SD = 5.4). All children were recruited from the Fondazione San 
Carlo Borromeo primary school in Livorno, Italy. Adult participants were recruited from the 
University of Pisa, Italy.  
Design and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
experimental conditions: The basic-level, subordinate-level or feature-enriched condition. 
Participants were given one object for each domain in random order and instructed to “please 
name as many features as you can think of that make the [object] different from other 
animals (or professions).” For each object given, participants had 5 minutes to verbally list 
all the features they could think of.  
Children who completed the study received a box of colored pencils. Adult 
participants were entered in a lottery for a chance to win a 30-euro Amazon gift card. 
Dependent measures. We analyzed the features generated with respect to (a) the 
number of features generated and (b) the type of features generated. Apart from higher order 
features (e.g., “dogs/Dalmatians have four legs and bark” or “doctors/dentists have a degree”) 
and specific features (e.g., “dogs bark” or “Dalmatians have black and white spots”; “doctors 
operate” or “dentists fix teeth”), we identified a third type of feature. These features were 
exclusively used by younger and a few older children who lacked knowledge of 
differentiating features pertaining to the objects they were given. Instead, to differentiate the 
objects, they stated what a given object was not, by picking other objects from the same 
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superordinate category (e.g., “It is not a snake” for the dog, or “It is not an architect” for the 
doctor). We refer to this type of feature as a contrast feature.  
Results 
We had given the two feature-enriched objects to 16 of the second-grade and 17 of 
the fifth-grade children when we decided to discontinue running the feature-enriched 
condition. Children were thoroughly confused by the three features. Instead of identifying 
additional differentiating features, they simply rephrased the three features provided with the 
basic-level object. Given that no additional features were generated, the results from this 
condition are relevant to answering our research question but were excluded from further 
analyses. 
Number of features. We ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with domain as the 
within-subject factor and age group and representation as between-subjects variables. As 
expected given the results of Study 1, we found a main effect of domain, F(1,97) = 37.4, p < 
.001, 2 = .28, with participants generating more features when asked to differentiate dogs 
from other animals (Manimals = 4.1; SD = 1.7) than doctors from other professions (Mprofessions 
= 3.1; SD = 1.6). We also found the hypothesized main effect of age group, F(2,97) = 4.7, p = 
.011, 2 =.09, with post hoc analyses showing that adults and older children (Madults = 3.9; SD 
= 1.4; Molder_children = 3.8; SD = 1.6) generated more features than younger children 
(Myounger_children = 2.9; SD = 0.7). 
The analysis also revealed the expected main effect of representation, F(1,97) = 5.4, p 
= .022, 2 =.05, with participants generating more features when given basic-level objects 
(Mbasic-level = 3.9; SD = 1.4) than subordinate-level objects (Msubordinate-level = 3.2; SD = 1.3). 
Finally, we found an interaction between domain and representation, F(1,97) = 9.9, p = .002, 
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2 =.1. The difference between the number of features generated in the basic-level and the 
subordinate-level condition was larger in the animals (Mbasic-level = 4.7; SD = 1.7; Msubordinate-
level = 3.5; SD = 1.4) than in the professions (Mbasic-level = 3.2; SD = 1.6; Msubordinate-level = 3; SD 
= 1.6) domain. 
Type of feature. Figure 4 displays the proportions of the three types of features 
generated—higher order, specific, and contrast—based on object domain and representation. 
As hypothesized, in the basic-level condition of both domains, participants generated a 
higher proportion of higher order features, of all the features generated, than in the 
subordinate-level condition. In the subordinate-level condition, adults and older children 
mainly generated specific features. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of features generated by age group, feature type (higher order, specific, and 
contrast), and condition (basic level and subordinate level) in (A) the animals domain and (B) the 
professions domain. 
A B 
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The main difference between adults and children is that few of the features generated 
by older children and many of the features younger children generated were contrast features. 
The proportion of contrast features was higher in the subordinate-level condition of both 
domains. 
Discussion 
Study 2 was designed to test the hypothesis that basic-level objects trigger more 
higher order features than subordinate-level or feature-enriched objects. Apart from the 
expected domain and age group effects, we found that the features generated differed 
quantitatively and qualitatively by the objects’ representation. We had to discontinue the 
feature-enriched condition because children were unable to come up with differentiating 
features other than those already provided. When the given objects were represented at the 
subordinate level (e.g., Dalmatian), participants rarely generated higher order features 
pertaining to the objects’ basic-level category (e.g., “Dalmatians have four legs”). Moreover, 
for younger children, and also older children in a few cases, finding differentiating features in 
the subordinate-level condition was particularly difficult. Instead, they described what the 
object was not by contrasting it with any other object from the same superordinate category 
(e.g., “It’s not the snake”).  
Results of Study 2 support the hypothesis that children’s performance on the Twenty 
Questions game is in part facilitated/hindered by the objects’ representation because it 
triggers certain types of features. Whereas basic-level objects trigger more higher order 
features that can be used to ask more general constraint-seeking questions, subordinate-level 
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and feature-enriched objects trigger specific features that may lead to hypothesis-scanning or 
pseudoconstraint-seeking questions. 
The type of questions asked depends not only on knowledge of differentiating 
features but also on the ability to identify the most effective among them (Brown, 1978; 
Gelman, 1978). With Study 3 we sought to test the extent to which the object representation 
facilitates the generation of higher order features versus the ability to select these features for 
asking constraint-seeking questions. 
Study 3 
In Study 2, we found that domain and representation had an impact on children’s and, 
to some extent, adults’ ability to come up with higher order features, which are needed to ask 
constraint-seeking questions. But do domain and representation also help in identifying those 
features that should be used for effective inquiry strategies? If not, eliminating differences in 
knowledge of higher order features should make the effects of domain and representation 
disappear, even though we should still find developmental differences between age groups 
(Mosher & Hornsby, 1966).  
To make the knowledge difference disappear, we used the same setup as in Study 1, 
but instead of letting participants generate questions we provided a choice set made up of 
constraint-seeking, hypothesis-scanning, and pseudoconstraint-seeking questions. Thus, 
participants did not need to come up with features but only had to select the questions with 
the features they considered most effective. 
Method 
CHAPTER 2 – EFFECT OF OBJECT REPRESENTATION ON CATEGORIZATION PERFORMANCE 
42 
Participants. We tested 36 second-grade children (18 females, Mage = 7.7 years; SD = 
0.5), 37 fifth-grade children (22 females, Mage = 9.7 years; SD = 0.6), and 41 adults (17 
females, Mage = 27.5 years; SD = 2.1). All children were recruited from the Fondazione Sacro 
Cuore primary school in Livorno, Italy. Adult participants were recruited from the University 
of Pisa, Italy. 
Design and procedure. Participants were presented with a computerized version of 
the Twenty Question game similar to the one used in Study 1. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the three experimental conditions: The basic-level, subordinate-level or 
feature-enriched condition. They played the same experimental condition in two games: In 
one game the objects were taken from the animals domain, and in the other from the 
professions domain (see the Appendix). The order in which the domains were presented was 
random. Participants could only ask three questions for each game. For each question, they 
could select from among a set of six options. The six options included always two constraint-
seeking questions (i.e., a perfect question, splitting the remaining objects into two equal 
groups, and a question with lower information gain, splitting the remaining objects into two 
groups of unequal size), two pseudoconstraint-seeking questions, and two hypothesis-
scanning questions.  
After participants had asked the third question, they had to guess the object the 
computer had randomly chosen by selecting one of the remaining objects. Children who 
guessed the right object in both games received a box of colored pencils. Adults who guessed 
both the objects were entered in a lottery in which the winner would be awarded a 30-euro 
Amazon gift card. 
Results 
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As for Study 1, we ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with question number and 
domain as within-subject factors, and representation and age group as between-subjects 
variables for all dependent measures.  
Information gain. We found no effect of domain or representation but a main effect 
of age group, F(2,106) = 19.2, p < .001, 2 = .27. Adults selected questions with higher 
information gain (Madults = 0.9; SD = 0.03) than older children (Molder_children = 0.75; SD = 
0.04), who selected questions with higher information gain than younger children 
(Myounger_children = 0.63; SD = 0.03).  
The analysis also showed a main effect of question number, F(2,106) = 4.88, p = 
.022, 2 = .04. For consecutive questions there was a general improvement in information 
gain, because the information gain of the hypothesis-scanning and pseudoconstraint-seeking 
questions increased as the remaining set of objects got smaller. 
Question type. The analysis showed a main effect of age group on the proportion of 
constraint-seeking questions of all the questions selected, F(2,106) = 21.1, p < .001, 2 = .5. 
Post hoc analyses showed that adults selected a higher proportion of constraint-seeking 
questions (92%; SD = 4%) than older children (68%; SD = 5%), who in turn selected a higher 
proportion of constraint-seeking questions than younger children (47%; SD = 5%).  
Similarly, with the proportion of hypothesis-scanning questions of all the questions 
selected as a dependent variable, we also found a main effect of age group, F(2,106) = 19.5, 
p < .001, 2 = .27. Post hoc analyses showed that younger children selected higher proportion 
of hypothesis-scanning questions (36%; SD = 4%) than older children (23%; SD = 4%), who 
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in turn selected higher proportion of hypothesis-scanning questions than adults (6%; SD = 
3%).  
With respect to the proportion of pseudoconstraint-seeking questions of all the 
questions selected, we again found a main effect of age group, F(2,106) = 10.4, p < .001, 2 = 
.16. Post hoc analyses revealed that younger children selected higher proportion of 
pseudoconstraint-seeking questions (18%; SD = 3%) than older children (10%; SD = 3%), 
who in turn selected higher proportion of pseudoconstraint-seeking questions than adults 
(2%; SD = 2%). We found no other main or interaction effect of domain or representation.  
General Discussion 
In Study 3, we found that when children did not have to generate features and 
questions to categorize objects, the effects of domain and object representation did not 
emerge. This suggests that the facilitating effect of basic-level objects and the hindering 
effect of subordinate and feature-enriched objects (Study 1) emerge only because of the types 
of features they trigger (Study 2). The representation does not help participants to identify 
and select more effective questions from a given set. 
These abilities seem to develop across the lifespan, as indicated by the persistent 
effect of age group across all Studies. Younger children showed the worst performance 
across all Studies. Compared to Study 1, where they had to generate features and questions, 
the main differences to Study 3 was that they asked less hypothesis-scanning questions (51% 
in Study 1 versus 26% in Study 3) and more constraint-seeking questions (29% in Study 1 
versus 47% in Study 3). The proportion of pseudoconstraint-seeking questions remained 
almost identical (20% in Study 1 versus 18% in Study 3). This suggests that although 
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younger children tend to prefer constraint over hypothesis-scanning questions, they are 
unaware that pseudocontraint-seeking questions are ineffective for categorizing.  
For older children the proportion of hypothesis-scanning questions remained identical 
(19% in Study 1 versus 23% in Study 3). In Study 1, they resorted to pseudoconstraint-
seeking questions in 35% of the cases, because, we hypothesized, they realized that 
hypothesis-scanning questions are not effective but were not yet able to generate features for 
asking constraint-seeking questions. Study 3 seems to confirm this hypothesis. When asked 
to choose from a set of question, only 10% of the questions older children selected were 
pseudoconstraint-seeking, whereas the majority of the questions they selected were 
constraint-seeking (68% in Study 3 versus 46% in Study 1). This indicates that older children 
are able to recognize and select the better constraint-seeking features once they see them. 
Some Practical Implications and Future Directions 
The results of our experiments suggest that the setup of a categorization task 
(generation versus selection of inquiry questions) and the representation of objects impact 
children’s categorization performance. That is, the facilitating effect of objects represented at 
the basic level and the hindering effect of subordinate-level and feature-enriched objects only 
emerged in Study 1, where participants had to generate inquiry questions. Given that in 
everyday life we are rarely–if ever–presented with a set of questions to choose from, basic-
level objects are one effective way to facilitate categorization performance in children. Future 
research should investigate whether and how basic-level objects can be used to explain and 
teach children more effectively how to identify good categorization questions, independent of 
the domain or representation of the objects.  
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To increase the ecological validity of the categorization task, our findings may also be 
extended to situations where the set of potential target objects is not given or constrained to a 
set of 20 alternative objects. Given that in real world situations we are rarely presented with a 
list of well-defined alternatives to select among, this setup will allow us to explore how 
people dynamically construct and update a set of possible alternatives while progressing in a 
categorization task. Further, this investigation would allow us to examine at which level of 
abstraction and representation children and adults naturally think when building a set of 
alternatives from scratch.  
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Appendix 
Objects Used in the Experiment, Listed by Domain (Animals, Professions) and Condition 
(Basic level, Subordinate, Feature-Enriched Basic Level) 
Basic level Subordinate level Feature-enriched basic-level 
Animals domain 
Sheep Lamb Sheep Pasture To bleat Wool 
Dog Dalmatian Dog Kennel To wag Collar 
Cat Persian Cat Pillow To purr Claws 
Cow Calf Cow Stable To moo Bells 
Horse Pony Horse Stable To neigh Saddle 
Fly Gnat Fly Poo To hum Antennae 
Bird Canary Bird Nest Beak Feathers 
Dinosaur Tyrannosaurus Dinosaur Prehistoric Intimidating Sharp teeth 
Snake Viper Snake Bush To slither Forked 
tongue 
Bear Panda Bear Den To hibernate Fur 
Monkey Gorilla Monkey Tree To climb Vine 
Bee Queen bee Bee Hive To make honey Pollen 
Spider Black widow Spider Web To weave Eight-legged 
Butterfly Moth Butterfly Flowers To flutter Colorful 
wings 
Chicken Chick Chicken Coop To lay eggs Crest 
Pig Boar Pig Sty To smell Snout 
Frog Tadpole Frog Pond To croak Green 
Crab Warty crab Crab Rock To pinch Claws 
Fish Sole Fish Sea Bait Fins 
Rabbit Hare Rabbit Wood To burrow Long ears 
Professions domain 
Doctor Dentist Doctor The E. R.  To evaluate Stethoscope 
Teacher Kindergarten 
teacher 
Teacher Classroom To explain Roster 
Cook Confectioner Cook Restaurant To taste Ladle 
Police Officer Detective Policeman Station Investigation Distinctive 
Singer Soprano Singer Stage Tone deaf Microphone 
Breeder Shepherd Breeder Farm To milk Work gloves 
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Basic level Subordinate level Feature-enriched basic-level 
Athlete Cyclist Athlete Stadium To train Sports bag 
Photographer Photojournalist Photograp
her 
Exhibition To focus Camera 
Musician Flautist Musician Orchestra To tune Instrument 
Actor Theater actor Actor Dressing 
room 
To act Script 
Soldier Parachutist Soldier Barracks To defend Machine gun 
Farmer Winegrower Farmer Field To hoe Tractor 
Craftsman Carpenter Craftsman Laboratory To draft Tools 





Tent To surprise Costume 
Politician Mayor Politician Parliament To discuss Tie 
Drawer Cartoonist Drawer Desk To erase Pencil 
Journalist Sports reporter Journalist Editorial 
office 
To interview Note pad 
Coach Soccer coach Coach Bench To encourage Stopwatch 
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When Children Make More Accurate Inferences Than Adults 
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Abstract 
In everyday decision making we do not always have the luxury of using certain 
knowledge but often have to rely on cues, that is, pieces of information that can aid 
reasoning. Are children capable of focusing on the most informative cues? Previous research 
on cue-based inference suggests contradicting answers that we argue to be rooted into the 
design used. We hypothesize that providing participants with a fixed set of cues from which 
to choose handicaps children because it requires assessing and comparing the 
informativeness of exogenously given cues they might not be familiar with or would not have 
chosen if allowed to generate their own cues. We tested second-, third-, and fifth-grade 
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children, and young adults on inference problems (which of two real cars is more expensive 
and which of two real cities has more inhabitants), manipulating whether cues were 
generated or given. Results show that, only when generating their own cues, younger 
children matched older children and young adults in accuracy, or even outperformed them. 
Younger children did so by generating cues that were as informative as those generated by 
older children and young adults.  
Introduction 
In everyday decision making we do not always have the luxury—the time, the 
knowledge, the cognitive and computational resources—of using certain knowledge but 
instead have to rely on cues. For our purposes a cue is a piece of information, such as a 
question, feature, or concept that is useful for making decisions. We focus here on a special 
kind of decision, an inference (e.g., which of two real cars is more expensive or which of two 
real cities has more inhabitants) for which there is an objective answer (one city is larger, or 
one car is more expensive). Decision makers have to reach the answer by inferring the 
relationship between the information collected and a criterion (in this case, the size of a city 
or the price of a car).  
In this paper we address the following question: Are children capable of focusing on 
the most informative cues? Most research on children’s decision making and cue-based 
inferences has focused on the number of cues children consult, concluding that children rely 
often on one or a few cues when making their choices or inferences (Bahn, 1986; Wartella, 
1979). Because strategies that look at only one piece of information are often easier and 
quicker, and sometimes more accurate (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 
1999), than strategies that rely on more cues, this behavior could be an adaptive response to 
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the cognitive load experienced by children when making decisions (Gregan-Paxton & 
Roedder John, 1995; Klayman, 1985) or to the general problem of maximizing total utility 
(Bereby-Meyer, Assor, & Katz, 2004; Mata, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011).  
Only a few studies, however, have attempted to investigate the quality of the cues 
children base their decisions or inferences on. Bereby-Meyer et al. (2004) asked children 
aged 8–9 and 12–13 years to choose among consumer products, such as bicycles or watches, 
after being given descriptions of the products’ cue values. The authors found that the few 
cues children based their decisions on were not randomly chosen but were the most important 
ones. Because in this study each child was asked to personally rate the importance of the 
cues, children selected the cue that, according to them, was the most informative, choosing 
the alternative that had the highest value on that cue and ignoring all other cues and their 
values (this strategy is a fast and frugal heuristic because it requires little information and 
computation; see Gigerenzer et al., 1999).   
In a more recent study, Mata et al. (2011) asked 9- to 12-year-olds to infer which of 
two cars would win a race, after providing descriptions of the cars’ cue values (e.g., 
horsepower or number of cylinders). Here, the children did not personally rate the cues, 
which were probably unfamiliar to at least some of them. Mata et al. concluded that less than 
30 of the children spontaneously used strategies that employed one or just a few cues. The 
authors suggested that children do not use such strategies because they cannot easily focus on 
the most informative cues. We propose that the contradictory results and conclusions 
obtained by Bereby-Mayer et al. (2004) and Mata et al. (2011) might be the result of different 
experimental designs being adopted. A thought experiment might help illustrate the problem.  
Imagine that you are faced with the following inference: Which of two cities is more 
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populous, City 1 or City 2? What would you like to know about these cities before 
answering? Now suppose you are faced with the same problem but this time you are given a 
set of available cues whose values you can look up: number of buildings, density of 
population, tourism, altitude, and area. Is the information you asked for in the first instance 
included in the set now presented to you? Would you still choose the same information you 
generated in the first place, or would you now select something else you did not think of, 
realizing it might be more predictive of the population of a city? 
We argue that the difference between these two testing methodologies might be 
crucial, and that choosing from among a set of cues might be problematic for children, even 
though this is the method traditionally used for testing cue-based inferences. First, it requires 
the children to assess and compare the informativeness of exogenously given cues they might 
not be familiar with, or the meaning of which they might not know (such as density of 
population, in our example). Second, a set of cues to choose among is a necessarily 
constrained selection that might not include all the possible useful information one could 
come up with. We argue that, to test children’s ability to base their choices on informative 
cues, a more suitable methodology is required. Thus, in the present study we did not provide 
participants with cues but instead prompted them to generate their own cues by letting them 
ask anything they wanted to about the objects (e.g., cities) they had to make inferences about. 
Participants would be familiar with the cues they themselves had generated. The process of 
searching for information by asking questions from scratch has been thoroughly studied 
(Graesser & McMahen, 1993; Graesser & Olde, 2003), also as a mechanism for cognitive 
development and knowledge acquisition (Chouinard, 2007; Vosniadou, 1994). However, to 
the best of our knowledge, it has never been used in researching cue-based decision making.  
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In this study, we tested children and young adults by manipulating whether cues were 
generated (Study 1) or given (Study 2), to investigate if and how these two designs would 
change the results. We hypothesized that when free to generate their own cues, (a) 
participants would consult less information, both because generating cues might be more 
effortful than selecting them, and because they would be more confident in what they had 
determined were the most informative cues; (b) each age group would generate different 
cues, because being at different developmental phases, participants would know a different 
number of cues of different quality; and (c) because of (b), children could generate cues that 
are objectively as informative as the cues generated by young adults and thus would be able 
to match the accuracy of young adults.  
Study 1: Free-Generation of Cues 
Method 
Participants. The experiment involved 66 participants: 17 children in the second and 
third grade (9 females, Mage = 7.8 years, SD = 0.39) and 27 children in the fifth grade (14 
females, Mage = 9.9 years, SD = 0.61) of a primary school
2 in Livorno, Italy, and 22 young 
adults (12 females, Mage = 17.9 years, SD = 0.75) recruited from a high school
3 in Livorno. 
The participants were all born in Italy and belonged to various social classes. The results of 
another 11 participants were excluded because of experimental errors or equipment 
malfunction. 
Design and procedure. The experiment was run on a computer and each session 
																																																								
	
2 Fondazione Sacro Cuore, Ardenza, Livorno. 
3 Liceo Scientifico “F. Cecioni”, Livorno. 
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consisted of eight trials. On each trial, participants were presented with two objects and asked 
to infer which object had the higher value on a criterion specified in the instructions for that 
trial. There were two possible criteria: The population of a city and the price of a car. For 
example, in one trial the participants had to infer whether Milan or Venice was more 
populous, and in another trial the participants had to infer whether a Doblò or a Panda was 
more expensive.  
Participants received in each trial a different pair of objects, randomly drawn from 
two environments: The 60 currently most populous Italian cities and 52 cars currently 
produced by two Italian car manufacturers (Fiat and Alfa Romeo). Our database included for 
each object its value on the criterion (city population or car price); there were 28 cue values 
for cities and 20 for cars. The cues were generated before the experiment in a survey with 15 
children aged 8–9 years old and 10 adults who did not take part in the experiment. The 
objects are listed in Table 1, and the cues are listed in Table 2.  
In Table 2 we also list cue success (Newell, Rakow, Weston, & Shanks, 2004), which 
we used in analyzing our results. In both experiments the cues generated (Study 1) or 
selected (Study 2) might be conflicting, meaning that some cues might point to the correct 
choice, whereas other cues might suggest an incorrect choice. The success of a cue in a task 
is the probability, in this particular task, that the cue will lead to a correct inference. To 
compute the success of a cue, it is assumed that if the cue has a higher value on one of the 
two objects, then this object will be picked, and if the cue has the same value on the two 
objects, then an object will be picked randomly.  
Besides the inference criterion (car-price or city-population), our second independent 
variable was whether objects were presented with names (i.e., the name of a city or the model 
of a car) or with generic labels instead of names (i.e., City 1 and City 2 or Car 1 and Car 2). 
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Finally, there were two trials for each of the four combinations of the two independent 
variables. These two trials constituted a block, and the order of the four blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Table 1 














Roma 2,724,347 Taranto 194,021 Sassari 130,306 Andria 99,249 
Milano 1,295,705 Brescia 190,844 Siracusa 124,083 Udine 99,071 
Napoli 963,661 Reggio Calabria 185,621 Pescara 123,022 Arezzo 98,788 
Torino 908,825 Prato 185,091 Monza 121,280 Cesena 95,525 
Palermo 659,433 Parma 182,389 Latina 117,149 La Spezia 95,372 
Genova 611,171 Modena 181,807 Bergamo 116,677 Lecce 94,775 
Bologna 374,944 Reggio Emilia 165,503 Forlì 116,208 Pesaro 94,197 
Firenze 365,659 Perugia 165,207 Vicenza 115,012 Barletta 93,869 










Venezia 270,098 Ravenna 155,997 Terni 112,021 Pistoia 89,982 










Padova 211,936 Rimini 140,137 Bolzano 101,919 Pisa 87,398 
Trieste 205,341 Ferrara 134,464 Piacenza 101,778 Lucca 84,186 
Car-price task 
















34,151 Croma Act. 24,101 Sedici 4×2 
Dynamic 
18,501 Panda 4×4 13,351 
Croma 
Emotion 
32,601 Multipla Act. 23,151 Bravo Dynamic 18,101 QUBO Act. 13,051 
Spider TBi 31,951 Bravo Dualogic 
Dyn. 





31,651 Idea BlackMotion 22,051 Punto Evo Sport 17,901 Punto Evo 
Act. 
11,951 
Ulysse Act. 30,701 500 Rock 21,601 147 Moving 17,481 500 Pop 11,701 





28,101 Multipla Dynamic 20,951 Idea BlackLabel 
GPL 
17,151 Punto Classic 
Act. 
11,001 
GT Prog. 26,551 Bravo Dualogic 
Dyn. 
20,501 Grande Punto 
Actual Nat. P. 
16,201 Punto Classic 10,301 
















26,501 Giulietta Turbo 
Prog. 





25,851 Doblò Dynamic 20,051 Doblò 1.4 Actual 15,101 600 7,951 
Table 2 
 Study 1: The Cues and Their Success in the Two Tasks 





Families 0.93 University  0.76 Airports (overall) 0.64 Seismic danger 0.53 
Buildings 0.92 Museums 0.70 Airports 
(international) 
0.64 Regional capital 0.52 
Primary 
Schools 
0.87 Universities 0.69 Hotels 0.62 Area 0.52 
Preschools 0.83 Density of 
population 







0.66 Age index 0.58 Climate zone 0.52 
High schools 0.80 Airports 
(civilian) 





0.64 Altitude 0.56 Airports (military) 0.51 
Car-price task 
Horsepower 0.88 Width 0.77 Acceleration 0.63 Fuel consumption 
(mixed) 
0.60 
Mass 0.85 Fuel tank 
capacity 
0.71 Brand 0.63 Number of seats 0.58 
Capacity 0.84 Coachwork 0.70 Trunk capacity 0.62 Fuel consumption 
(highway) 
0.58 
Speed 0.83 Gears 0.68 Fuel consumption 
(city) 
0.62 Height 0.54 
Length 0.78 Type of fuel 0.67 Revolutions p.m. 0.60 Doors 0.51 
 
The two objects (cities or cars) were displayed on a computer screen. The participants 
were prompted to generate cues freely by asking questions about the objects. For example, 
they might ask if the cities had a university or what the cars’ maximum speed was. The only 
restriction was that cues with subjective values were not allowed: Questions such as “Are 
these cars cool?” or “Do you think I would like to live in one of these cities?” were not 
answered or considered in the analysis. When an objective cue (e.g., presence of a university 
in a city) was generated, the experimenter provided the values of the two objects on that cue 
by using a database stored in the computer. The values of the cues that participants generated 
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were displayed on the screen until the end of the trial. The participants were allowed to ask 
for as many cues as they wanted, even none. If participants generated cues not available in 
the database, they were told that these cue values were not available. Some cues that we did 
not expect—and hence did not have in our database—were very original and smart, such as 
number of McDonald’s in a city (generated by a 10-year-old child) and number of television 
advertisements for a car (generated by a 17-year-old). Table 3 lists cues that participants 
generated themselves but that were not included in the database: They are not considered in 
the analysis of frugality, because frugality is a measure of the usable cues for making an 
inference, and in these cases participants did not get any answer they could use to make the 
inferences.  
Table 3 
 Study 1: Generated Cues That Were Not Included in the Database  
Task Participants asking for this cue Cue 
City population 1 younger child Number of monuments 
 1 younger child, 1 young adult  Number of shopping malls 
 1 older child Number of McDonald’s 
 1 older child Number of streets 
 1 young adult Existence of a dialect 
 2 young adults First letter 
Car price 1 older child Kind of rims 
 2 younger children, 2 older children Color 
 2 younger children, 1 older child, 2 young adults The most recent 
 1 young adult Number of TV advertisements 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the participants received 60 tokens. For each 
correct inference they gained five tokens, whereas an incorrect inference left their number of 
tokens unchanged. Also, participants had to pay one token for each cue they asked for. The 
number of tokens was continually updated and appeared in the corner of the screen. The 
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participants were told that, for each age group, the three participants with the highest number 
of tokens at the end of the experiment would be rewarded with bookstore vouchers of 45, 25, 
and 15 euros, respectively. We implemented this particular incentive system because we 
wanted to better model real decision making, where both the information and the process of 
acquiring it are often costly. 
The experimenter tested each participant individually and all sessions were audio 
recorded. Participants took on average 25 min (ranging from 18 to 35 min) to go through the 
session, including reading the instructions. The experimenter read aloud the instructions, the 
two objects and criterion for each trial, and the values of the generated cues; this information 
was also displayed on the computer screen. To minimize potential effects of computer 
literacy, only the experimenter operated the computer. 
Results 
We compared the performances of the three age groups on four outcomes: (1) 
frugality, (2) accuracy, in terms of percentage of correct inferences, (3) specific cues 
generated, and (4) success of the generated cues.  
Frugality. The frugality of a decision is indicated by the number of cues used to 
make an inference (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). The smaller this number is, the more frugal the 
decision is. As a proxy for frugality, we used the number of cues generated by participants. 
As shown in Table 4 (panel above) and confirmed by a Repeated Measures ANOVA with 
factors label (2 levels: names versus generic labels) and task (2 levels: cities versus cars), 
participants made more frugal decisions when objects had names, F(1, 66) = 24.97, p < .001, 
η2 = .28, which makes sense because names can carry information. Moreover, the 
participants generated more cues in the car-price task, F(1, 66) = 10.23, p = .002, η2 = .14. 
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All other main or interaction effects on frugality had p > .1; in particular, we did not find any 
effect of age on frugality.  
The numbers in Table 4 (panel below) suggest that one-cue strategies were prevalent. 
As they had to pay one token for each cue they asked for, this result is not too surprising per 
se. Indeed, in most trials, only one cue was generated. For example, in 64 of the trials—that 
is, in 22 out of 34 trials—younger children generated one cue in the car-price task when the 
objects were presented with generic labels. If we consider only the generic-labels condition, 
to be sure that no prior knowledge was taken into account, we can observe that participants 
relied on one-cue strategies in more than 50% of the trials. Moreover, younger children 
seemed to rely on one-cue strategies a bit more than the other two age groups, and only for 
children was there an effect of task, children being more willing to ask for only one cue in the 
city-population task. 
Table 4 
Study 1: Frugality in Terms of Mean Number (and Standard Deviations) of Cues Generated by the 
Participants (Panel Above), and in Terms of Overall Number of Trials in Which One Cue Was 
Generated (Panel Below, Shown in Both Percentages and Natural Frequencies 
Mean number of cues generated 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
Younger children 0.88 (SD 0.38) 1.24 (SD 0.44) 1.00 (SD 0.79) 1.53 (SD 0.93)  
Older children 0.89 (SD 0.45) 1.15 (SD 0.52) 1.33 (SD 0.79)  1.44 (SD 0.76) 
Young adults 1.00 (SD 0.65) 1.39 (SD 0.57)  1.18 (SD 0.66) 1.36 (SD 0.41) 
Overall number of trials in which one cue was generated 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
Younger children 82 (28 out of 34) 82 (28 out of 34) 42 (14 out of 34) 64 (22 out of 34) 
Older children 76 (38 out of 50) 72 (36 out of 50) 42 (21 out of 50) 52 (26 out of 50) 
Young adults 57 (25 out of 44) 57 (25 out of 44) 50 (22 out of 44) 55 (24 out of 44) 
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Accuracy. Table 5 (panel above) presents the accuracy results for the trials where 
participants did not ask for any cues. We deemed these inferences made without generating 
cues in the generic-labels condition (in only 3 out of 256 trials) to be random guesses. The 
results of the names condition might indicate inferences based on prior knowledge, but we 
cannot exclude them to be random guesses, too. We are not interested in further investigating 
these results. 
Table 5 
Study 1: Accuracy (as Percentage of Correct Inferences) in Problems Where No Cues Were 
Generated (Panel Above), and in Problems Where at Least One Cue Was Generated (Panel Below). 
Number of Such Problems Out of the Total Number of Problems and Standard Deviations Are Given 
in Parentheses 
Problems where no cues were generated 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
Younger 
children 
60 (5 out of 34, SD 51) --- (0 out of 34, SD ---) 91 (11 out of 34, SD 48) --- (0 out of 34, SD ---) 
Older 
children 
50 (10 out of 54, SD 42) 100 (1 out of 54, SD ---) 71 (9 out of 54, SD 43) 100 (1 out of 54, SD ---) 
Young 
adults 
67 (9 out of 44, SD 46) 100 (1 out of 44, SD  ---) 80 (10 out of 44, SD 40) --- (0 out of 44, SD ---) 
Problems where at least one cue was generated 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
Younger 
children 
68 (29 out of 34, SD 42) 73 (34 out of 34, SD 31) 82 (23 out of 34, SD 35) 91 (34 out of 34, SD 20) 
Older 
children 
56 (44 out of 54, SD 40) 55 (53 out of 54, SD 40) 62 (45 out of 54, SD 38) 65 (53 out of 54, SD 40) 
Young 
adults 
73 (34 out of 44, SD 33) 53 (43 out of 44, SD 30) 77 (34 out of 44, SD 33) 86 (44 out of 44, SD 23) 
 
Table 5 (panel below) shows the percentages of correct inferences for those problems 
where the participants generated at least one cue. A Repeated Measure ANOVA with factors 
label (2 levels: names versus generic labels) and task (2 levels: cities versus cars), showed 
that: First, there were no effects of labels on accuracy. Second, there was a main effect of age 
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on accuracy, F(2,66) = 8.40, p = .001, η2 = .21. All post-hoc analyses revealed no overall 
differences in terms of accuracy between younger children and young adults. Third, there 
was a main effect of task on accuracy, F(1,66) = 10.79, p = .002, η2 = .15: All participants 
performed better in the car-price task.  
Looking at Table 5 (panel below), we can see that in the names condition, younger 
children in the car-price task performed as well as young adults, and even slightly better, 
whereas in the city-population task young adults had an advantage. In the generic-labels 
condition, surprisingly, younger children outperformed young adults in both tasks. A possible 
explanation for our results is that younger children were able to generate more successful 
cues and so performed better in the generic-labels condition.  
The cues generated. In the city-population task both older children and young adults 
generated more diverse cues than younger children (14, 21, and 6 cues, respectively). Even if 
we consider only the cues asked by at least two participants, older children and young adults 
still generated more diverse cues than younger children (10, 14, and 4 cues, respectively). In 
the car-price task, the participants generated a similar number of diverse cues (younger 
children: 16, older children: 21, young adults: 14). The number of cues generated by at least 
two older children, young adults, and younger children was 9, 12, and 9, respectively. Figure 
1 shows the percentage of participants by age group who generated a certain cue in the city-
population task and in the car-price task, taking into account only the cues generated by at 
least 10 of the participants of one age group.  
In the city-population task (Figure 1A), more than 40% of all the participants 
(Myounger_children= 41%, Molder_children= 45%, Myoung_adults = 43%) generated the cue “area.” 
Almost half of the younger children (48%) generated the cue “number of buildings,” a cue 
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generated by only 13% of the older children and 4% of the young adults. The cues “tourism” 
and “density of population,” the former generated by 11% of the older children and the latter 
by 10% of the young adults, were both generated by only a few of the younger children. 
In the car-price task (Figure 1B), two cues predominated for the younger children, 
with 31% of the children generating “width” and 22% “length”; 31% of the young adults 
generated the cue “horsepower” and 22% generated “capacity”. The other cues were 
generated by relatively few of the young adult participants. Older children, on the other hand, 
seemed not to have a strong preference for any one cue, even though many of them generated 
“length” (17%), “speed” (18%), “width” (12%), and “horsepower” (10%).  
  
Figure 1. Study 1: Percentage of participants by group who generated a certain cue in (A) the city-
population task and (B) the car-price task. 
 
Success of generated cues. Table 6 displays the average success of the cues 
generated by the participants. A Repeated Measure ANOVA with factors label (2 levels: 
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labels, F(1,66) =6.32, p = .015, η2 = .09: Overall, when the objects were presented by using 
their names, participants generated more successful cues. We found a main effect of age, 
F(1,66) = 7.74, p = .001, η2 = .2: All post-hoc analyses revealed overall no difference 
between younger children and adults in terms of success of the generated cues, whereas older 
children generated less successful cues. We also found a main effect of task, F(1,66) = 17.22, 
p < .001, η2 = .22, and an interaction between age group and task, F(2,66) = 4.86, p = .011, η2 
= .13: In general, participants generated more successful cues in the car-price task. Though, 
in the generic-labels condition, younger children generated more successful cues in the city-
population task. This fits with our finding of higher accuracy of younger children in the city-
population task. But, as we saw, younger children performed better in the car-price task, as 
well. One reason for their better performance is that younger children always interpreted the 
cue in the right direction (i.e., the longer it is, the more expensive it should be), and they 
applied a cue only in those problems where it led to a correct inference. On the contrary, six 
different adults, in six trials, did not interpret correctly the direction where the cue pointed: 
After generating only one cue, in one trial they chose the slower car, in three trials the car 
with the lower power, in two cases the car with less horsepower.4 
Table 6 
Study 1: Average Success (and Standard Deviations) of the Cues Generated by the Participants 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
Younger children 0.72 (0.18) 0.75 (0.19) 0.75 (0.13) 0.70 (0.12) 
																																																								
	
4 We could not resist the temptation to ask some of the students we interviewed what horsepower is. One of 
them innocently replied: “Horsepower? I really have no clue. But I suppose it is something I should ask if I have 
to pick one of two cars, no?” 
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Older children 0.63 (0.15) 0.63 (0.15) 0.76 (0.11) 0.74 (0.10) 
Young adults 0.69 (0.17) 0.63 (0.16) 0.78 (0.12) 0.80 (0.11) 
Summary of the results of Study 1 
In Study 1 we tested children and young adults on inference problems about real 
objects, by prompting them to generate their own cues. We focused on the frugality of the 
decisions (i.e., the number of cues asked), the accuracy of the participants, the specific cues 
generated, and their success (which is a measure of how often the cue points to the correct 
inference). 
We found that (1) all participants and especially younger children mostly generated 
only one cue; (2) for problems where no names were given—only generic labels, such as Car 
1 and Car 2—younger children outperformed the other two age groups in making cue-based 
inferences, in both tasks; (3) children and young adults generated different cues, and 
participants belonging to the same age group generated the same one or two cues more often; 
and (4) younger children overall generated cues that were as successful as those generated by 
the other two age groups, their cues being more successful than the ones generated by the 
older children and young adults in the city-population task. 
In Study 2, we test if the results obtained in Study 1, leading to different conclusions 
than Mata et al. (2011), are due to the experimental designed adopted, as hypothesized.  
Study 2: Fixed Set of Cues 
Method 
Participants. The experiment involved 75 participants: 24 children in the second and 
third grade (11 females, Mage = 8.4 years, SD = 0.72) and 15 children in the fifth grade (7 
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females, Mage = 10.3 years, SD = 0.46) of a primary school
5 in Livorno, Italy, and 36 young 
adults (7 females, Mage = 17.4 years, SD = 0.65) recruited from a high school
6 in Livorno. 
The participants were all born in Italy and belonged to various social classes.  
Design and procedure. In this second experiment the design and the objects used 
were the same as in Study 1 (see Table 1), with one crucial difference: Participants were not 
allowed to generate their own cues but had to select them from a fixed set of five cues by 
clicking on a corresponding button on the screen.  
There were two different sets of cues for each of the two inference tasks: One set 
comprised the five cues generated the most by the participants in Study 1 (as in Figure 1, 
with the addition of the cue “altitude” in the city-population task, not included in the Figure 
because generated by less than 10 of the participants). We will refer to this set of cues as the 
“new cues.” The other set comprised, for the cities, five of the nine cues in the original city 
task of Gigerenzer et al. (1999): Number of universities, number of museums, number of 
soccer teams playing in the first league, number of train stations, whether the city is a 
regional capital or not (instead of the original cue state capital). We excluded four cues from 
the original task: three that were not applicable in Italy (the license plate, industrial belt, and 
East Germany cues) and the one that was the least successful of the original nine (national 
capital). Moreover, we modified some of the other cues (“Is the city on the Intercity line?” 
became “Number of train stations” and “Was the city once an exposition site?” became 
“Number of museums”) mainly to have cues with continuous values instead of binary cues. 
For the cars, the second cue set comprised the first five cues shown in car descriptions on a 
																																																								
	
5 Istituto Sacro Cuore, Livorno. 
6 Liceo Scientifico “F. Enriques”, Livorno. 
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popular Italian website advertising and selling used cars.7 We will refer to the set of cues 
taken from Gigerenzer et al. (1999) and the used car website as the “old cues”, to indicate 
that these cues come from prior research stimuli. Some of the old cues coincide with the new 
cues, generated by the participants in Study 1. Because of the rationale that led us to the 
selection of the cues in both cue sets, we saw no reasons in excluding any of them. All cues 
and their relative success rates are presented in Table 7.  
Table 7 
Study 2: The Cues and Their Success in the Two Tasks, For the 
New-Cues and Old-Cues Manipulations 
City-population task Car-price task 
Cue Success Cue Success 
New-cues manipulation 
Buildings 0.92 Horsepower 0.88 
Density of population 0.67 Capacity 0.84 
Tourism 0.64 Speed 0.83 
Altitude 0.56 Length 0.78 
Area 0.52 Width 0.77 
Old-cues manipulation 
Universities  0.76 Horsepower 0.88 
Train stations 0.74 Capacity 0.84 
Museums 0.70 Type of fuel 0.67 
Soccer teams 0.66 Fuel consumption 0.62 
Regional capital 0.52 Number of seats 0.58 
 
Study 2 differed also in that participants faced in total 40 trials, divided in two rounds 
of 20 trials. In each round, we gave the participants either the old-cues set or the new-cues 




CHAPTER 3 – MAKE YOUR OWN KIND OF CUES 
73 
variable. Each round consisted of five trials for each of the four blocks constituting the 2 × 2 
matrix design, having as independent variables the task (city-population and car-price) and 
the objects’ presentation (either by using their names or by using general labels). The order 
of the rounds and the four blocks within the rounds, as well as the order of the manipulations 
and the position of the cue buttons on the screen, was randomized.   
Results 
We compared the performance of the three age groups according to the same four 
criteria we used for analyzing the results in Study 1: (1) frugality, (2) accuracy, in terms of 
percentage of correct inferences, (3) specific cues selected, and (4) success of the selected 
cues. 
Frugality. Regarding the average number of cues the participants consulted (Table 8, 
panel above), a Repeated Measures ANOVA with factors label (2 levels: names versus 
generic labels), task (2 levels: cities versus cars) and cue-set (2 levels: old versus new cues) 
revealed a main effect of the cue-set manipulation, F(1,75) = 12.82, p = .001, η2 = .15: 
Participants selected more cues in the new-cues manipulation. We found no main effect of 
task, but we did find a main effect of age on the number of cues participants looked up: F(1, 
75) = 9.40, p < .001, η2 = .21. All post-hoc analyses revealed no difference in terms of 
number of cues looked up between young adults and older children, whereas younger 
children looked up more cues than the other two age groups.  
The Repeated Measures ANOVA also showed that, as expected given that the names 
carry information, participants looked up more cues in the condition where the objects were 
presented with generic labels, F(1,75) = 33.81, p < .001, η2 = .32. We also found an 
interaction effect between age and labels, F(2,75) = 14.84, p < .001, η2 = .29, and an 
CHAPTER 3 – MAKE YOUR OWN KIND OF CUES 
74 
interaction between task and labels, F(1,75) = 18.02, p < .001, η2 = .20.  
The numbers in Table 8 (panel below) suggest that in Study 2, unlike in Study 1, one-
cue strategies were used in less than 50% of the trials, except for the car-price trials of the 
old-cues manipulation, in the generic-labels condition. However, the incentive system was 
the same as in Study 1, that is, participants still had to pay one token for each cue they asked 
for. We did not find any consistent effect of age on the percentage of trials in which only one 
cue was selected.  
Table 8 
Study 2: Frugality in Terms of Mean Number (and Standard Deviations) of Cues Selected by the 
Participants (Panel Above), and in Terms of Overall Number of Trials in Which One Cue Was 
Selected (Panel Below, Shown in Both Percentages and Natural Frequencies), for the New-Cues and 
Old-Cues Manipulations 
Mean Number of Cues Selected 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
New-cues manipulation 
Younger children 1.9 (1.6) 2.2 (1.5) 2.3 (1.5) 2.2 (1.3) 
Older children 0.9 (1.0) 1.3 (1.4) 0.9 (0.8) 1.0 (0.9) 
Young adults 0.9 (0.6) 1.7 (0.7) 1.3 (0.9) 1.6 (0.5) 
Old-cues manipulation 
Younger children 1.9 (1.6) 1.9 (1.2) 1.8 (1.2) 1.7 (1.0) 
Older children 0.5 (0.8) 1.0 (0.8) 0.7 (0.6) 0.9 (0.6) 
Young adults 0.6 (0.5) 1.7 (0.6) 1.2 (0.5) 1.5 (0.6) 
Overall Number of Trials in Which One Cue Was Selected 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
New-cues manipulation 
Younger children 35 (42 out of 120) 41 (49 out of 120) 29 (35 out of 120) 31 (37 out of 120) 
Older children 37 (28 out of 75) 45 (34 out of 75) 39 (29 out of 75) 52 (39 out of 75) 
Young adults 29 (52 out of 180) 32 (58 out of 180) 31 (56 out of 180) 44 (79 out of 180) 
Old-cues manipulation 
Younger children 30 (36 out of 120) 43 (52 out of 120) 40 (48 out of 120) 57 (68 out of 120) 
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Older children 25 (19 out of 75) 49 (37 out of 75) 45 (34 out of 75) 55 (41 out of 75) 
Young adults 29 (52 out of 180) 45 (81 out of 180) 44 (80 out of 180) 61 (109 out of 180) 
  
Accuracy. As in Study 1, we first looked at the accuracy reached by the participants 
in the trials where they did not ask for any cues (Table 9, panel above). We found that in the 
generic-labels condition younger children and adults only in few trials made inferences 
without acquiring any information, whereas the number of trials in which older children 
randomly guessed is higher (20-24 trials out of 75). In the names condition, as already 
pointed out, the results might indicate inferences from prior knowledge, even though we 
cannot rule out that they were random guesses. Because we are mainly interested in the 
process of cue-selection, we do not report on these results.  
Table 9 
Study 2: Accuracy (as Percentage of Correct Inferences) in Problems Where No Cues Were Selected 
(Panel Above), and in Problems Where At Least One Cue Was Selected (Panel Below), for the New-
Cues and Old-Cues Manipulations. Number of Such Problems Out of the Total Number of Problems 
Is Given in Parentheses 
Problems where no cues were selected 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
New-cues manipulation 
Younger children 76 (21 out of 120, SD 18) 44 (9 out of 120, SD 19) 33 (12 out of 120, SD 18) 
50 (8 out of 120, SD 
19) 
Older children 70 (33 out of 75, SD 25) 46 (24 out of 75, SD 21) 50 (32 out of 75, SD 27) 
37 (24 out of 75, SD 
23) 
Young adults 79 (73 out of 180, SD 23) 60 (10 out of 180, SD 19) 71 (49 out of 180, SD 15) 
29 (7 out of 180, SD 
17) 
Old-cues manipulation 
Younger children 62 (29 out of 120, SD 20) 33 (9 out of 120, SD 22) 37 (16 out of 120, SD 21) 33 (6 out of 120, SD 25) 
Older children 75 (49 out of 75, SD 25) 38 (21 out of 75, SD 24) 70 (33 out of 75, SD 22) 60 (20 out of 75, SD 30) 
Young adults 85 (101 out of 180, SD 18) 83 (6 out of 180, SD 18) 80 (40 out of 180, SD 16) 80 (5 out of 180, SD 15) 
Problems where at least one cue was selected 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
New-cues manipulation 
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Younger children 66 (99 out of 120, SD 23) 56 (111 out of 120, SD 26) 83 (108 out of 120, SD 21) 77 (112 out of 120, SD 25) 
Older children 69 (42 out of 75, SD 25) 69 (51 out of 75, SD 25) 70 (43 out of 75, SD 30) 72 (51 out of 75, SD 27) 
Young adults 78 (107 out of 180, SD 18) 78 (170 out of 180, SD 19) 90 (131 out of 180, SD 17) 88 (173 out of 180, SD 15) 
Old-cues manipulation 
Younger children 80 (91 out of 120, SD 19) 68 (111 out of 120, SD 24) 73 (104 out of 120, SD 22) 79 (114 out of 120, SD 20) 
Older children 54 (26 out of 75, SD 22) 63 (54 out of 75,SD 23) 71 (42 out of 75, SD 15) 71 (55 out of 75,SD 22) 
Young adults 66 (79 out of 180, SD 15) 83 (174 out of 180,SD 13) 84 (140 out of 180, SD 19) 86 (175 out of 180, SD 16) 
 
The percentages of correct inferences for those problems where the participants 
looked up at least one cue are shown in Table 9 (panel below). A Repeated Measures 
ANOVA with factors label (2 levels: names versus generic labels), task (2 levels: cities 
versus cars) and cue-set (2 levels: old versus new cues) revealed no effect of the cue-set 
manipulation on accuracy. We also found no effects of labels, but a main effect of task on 
accuracy, F(1,75) = 12.52, p = .001, η2 = .15: For the most part, participants performed better 
in the car-price task, the exception being that younger children performed better in the city-
population task in the names condition with the old-cues manipulation.  
We also found a main effect of age on accuracy, F(2,75) = 26.68, p < .001, η2 = .43, 
and all post-hoc analyses confirmed that adults always performed overall better than children, 
and younger children better than older children. Moreover, there is an interaction effect 
between task and labels, F(1,75) = 6.5, p = .013, η2 = .08, and between task, cue-set 
manipulation and age group, F(2, 75) = 3.75, p = .028, η2 = .09.  
The cues selected. Figures 2 and 3 show the percentages of participants by age group 
who selected particular cues in the two manipulations, for both tasks. In the city-population 
task with the new-cues manipulation (Figure 2A), young adults focused on three main cues: 
44% of them selected the cue “density of population,” 23% the cue “area,” the least 
successful cues in the set, and only 29% the cue “number of buildings,” the most successful 
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cue in the set. In contrast, younger and older children showed no preference for any particular 
cue, being very close to the random distribution of 20% per cue, even though fewer of them 
selected the cue “altitude.”  
In the car-price task of this manipulation (Figure 2B), young adults showed a similar 
pattern, focusing on mainly two cues: “capacity” (41%) and “horsepower” (35%)—the most 
successful cues in the set. Children were a bit more selective in this task, focusing on the cues 
“horsepower” (29% of the younger and 26% of the older children) and “speed” (24% of the 
younger and 27% of the older children).  
 
 
Figure 2. Study 2: Percentage of participants by group who selected particular cues in (A) the city-
population task and (B) the car-price task with the new-cues manipulation. 
 
A B 
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Figure 3. Study 2: Percentage of participants by group who selected particular cues in (A) the city-
population task and (B) the car-price task with the old-cues manipulation. 
In the city-population task of the old-cues manipulation (Figure 3A), young adults 
focused mainly on the cues “train stations” (35%) and “universities” (34%). Older children 
selected the cue “regional capital” a bit more often (29%), whereas younger children’s 
selection of cues is close to the random distribution. In the car-price task (Figure 3B), all the 
age groups seemed to be more selective: Young adults chose mainly to look at the cues 
“capacity” (42%) and “horsepower” (37%), older children the cue “number of seats” (41%), 
and younger children the cue “horsepower” (32%). 
Success of selected cues. In Table 10 we can see the average success of the cues 
selected by the participants. Overall, a Repeated Measures ANOVA with factors label (2 
levels: names versus generic labels), task (2 levels: cities versus cars) and cue-set (2 levels: 
old versus new cues) revealed no differences between the two conditions (names versus 
generic labels). The quality of the cues selected in the car-price task was higher than in the 
city-population task, F(1,55) = 130.03, p < .001, η2 = .71. This is not surprising, because of 
B 
A B 
CHAPTER 3 – MAKE YOUR OWN KIND OF CUES 
79 
the more successful cues available in this task. The average success of the cues consulted in 
the new-cues manipulation was also higher, F(1,55) = 32.12, p < .001, η2 = .38: Again, this is 
due to the fact that the cues available in this manipulation were, on average, more successful.  
The analysis revealed a main effect of age on quality, F(2, 55) = 17.53, p < .001, η2 = 
.4: All post-hoc analyses showed that young adults, overall, selected more successful cues 
than younger ad older children, and younger children selected more successful cues than 
older children.  
We also found a interaction effect between task and the cue-set manipulation, F(1, 55) 
= 17.74, p < .001, η2 = .25, and an interaction between age group and cue-set manipulation, 
F(2, 55) = 8.84, p < .001, η2 = .25. 
Table 10 
Study 2: Average Success (and Standard Deviations) of the Cues Selected by the 
Participants, for the New-Cues and Old-Cues Manipulations 
Group 
City-population task Car-price task 
Names Generic-labels Names Generic-labels 
New-cues manipulation 
Younger children 0.69 (0.08) 0.68 (0.06) 0.83 (0.02) 0.83 (0.02) 
Older children 0.69 (0.12) 0.72 (0.08) 0.82 (0.03) 0.81 (0.03) 
Young adults 0.69 (0.11) 0.71 (0.10) 0.86 (0.02) 0.85 (0.02) 
Old-cues manipulation 
Younger children 0.69 (0.03) 0.70 (0.03) 0.76 (0.06) 0.76 (0.07) 
Older children 0.63 (0.08) 0.64 (0.06) 0.67 (0.08) 0.67 (0.06) 
Young adults 0.71 (0.04) 0.72 (0.04) 0.82 (0.05) 0.82 (0.04) 
 
Summary of the results of Study 2 
In Study 2 we tested children and young adults on the same inference problems used 
in Study 1. In this experiment, however, we adopted an experimental design that has been 
CHAPTER 3 – MAKE YOUR OWN KIND OF CUES 
80 
predominantly used when testing cue-based inferences: Participants had to choose which 
cues to consult from a preliminarily defined fixed set. These five cues in the new-cues 
manipulation were the top five cues generated by the participants in Study 1; in the old-cues 
manipulation they were either five of the cues used in the original city-population task 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999) or the first five cues shown in car descriptions on a popular Italian 
website advertising and selling used cars. As in the first experiment, we focused on the 
frugality and the accuracy of the inferences made, as well as on the specific cues generated, 
and on their success. 
We found that (1) participants used one-cue strategies in less than 50% of the trials, in 
almost all the conditions; (2) young adults always outperformed the other two age groups in 
making cue-based inferences; (3) young adults always focused on some specific cues, even 
though they were not always the most successful ones (as in the city-population task), 
whereas children did not focus on any cues in particular; and (4) young adults selected more 
successful cues than children. Note that these results are different from those of Study 1, 
where participants were free to generate cues. 
General Discussion 
In this paper we tested children and young adults on the same inference problems by 
using both a new and an established experimental procedure: In Study 1 participants were 
prompted to generate their own cues, whereas in Study 2 they had to select from a list of 
available cues, either “old cues” that have been used in the previous literature (Gigerenzer et 
al., 1999) or “new cues” that were generated by other participants. This comparison allowed 
us to investigate whether and under what conditions children are capable of focusing on the 
most informative cues and, in general, to explore the generation of cues that people find 
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informative, a so-far little-studied issue in cue-based inference.  
First, we found that in Study 1 all participants and especially younger children mostly 
generated one cue, whereas in Study 2 they looked up more cues, even though in both 
experiments participants had to pay one token for each cue consulted. There are two possible 
explanations for this result, not mutually exclusive but compatible. On the one hand, it may 
have been that selecting cues from a given set was much less effortful than generating them 
from scratch. On the other hand, in Study 1, participants could only compare cues against 
others in their own cuebox, which we define as the set of cues available and usable for 
making an inference. Assuming that they had generated the most successful cue in their cue 
box first, participants might have been so confident in its predictive power that they thought 
the inference could be based on only that cue. In Study 2, in contrast, participants, presented 
with cues that they would not have considered otherwise, might have doubted the ranking of 
the most successful cues in their cuebox. This, together with the fact that the cues given to 
them were all informative cues, may have prompted participants to look up more cues to gain 
more confidence in which inference to make.  
Second, in Study 1, for problems where objects were presented with generic labels 
instead of names, younger children outperformed the other two age groups in making cue-
based inferences, in both tasks. On the other hand, in Study 2 young adults always 
outperformed children. We think the accuracy in cue-based inferences depends on the 
success of the cues generated/selected (see below) and on the ability of the participants to 
interpret the cues correctly, that is, to understand the direction in which the cues point. 
Third, we found that in Study 1 children focused on one or two cues, generating them 
more frequently than other cues, whereas in Study 2, overall, they did not focus on any of the 
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available cues in particular. Moreover, we found that in both experiments, young adults 
asked for task-specific cues that were somewhat “technical” and referred to hidden features 
of the objects—for example, horsepower or capacity in the car-price task, and density of 
population or area in the city-population task. In contrast, the cues on which younger children 
focused in Study 1 were more perceptual, observable cues, such as number of buildings in the 
city-population task, and length or height in the car-price task.  
Indeed, children, being novices in most domains of inference, may first learn mostly 
perceptual cues, as young children are often “concrete” or “perceptually bound” (Flavell, 
1985; Wartella, 1979), even though this limitation is less extensive than originally believed 
(Keil, 1989; Wellman & Gelman, 1988). As they grow up, children face new inference 
domains and deepen their knowledge of old domains, continually acquiring and reorganizing 
domain-specific knowledge (Carey, 1985). As children understand and grasp more concepts 
and terms, they also learn cues that go beyond appearances, cues related to hidden features 
and structures (horsepower, density of population) that are possibly more “technical.” This 
learning process leads to an update of cues in the cuebox that we argue is biased: The more 
technical cues are intuitively assumed to be more informative than the general, perceptual 
cues that were there before, because they are more elaborate and appropriate—even when we 
do not know exactly what they mean or how to interpret them. By bias we mean an 
asymmetrical tendency that is not good or bad per se: A bias that favors technical cues often 
leads to more accurate inferences, but these technical cues are not always the most 
informative.  
Indeed, our fourth main result shows that in Study 1, children, somehow naturally 
biased towards perceptual cues, generated cues that were overall as successful as those 
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generated by the young adults, and even better in the city-population task, where perceptual 
cues happened to be more successful.  
In conclusion, we showed that “making your own kind of cues,” paraphrasing Mama 
Cass Elliot, matters. Compared to the set-up of Study 1, the set of cues presented in Study 2 
indeed had a very different, if not opposite, effect on our participants. Having to compare 
cues they would not have considered otherwise might have been confusing for all the 
participants, who felt tempted to look up more cues to increase their confidence about their 
inference. However, young adults recognized that some of the cues offered were even more 
successful than any they would have thought of and selected them. Children, in contrast, 
probably unfamiliar with some of the cues presented, could not recognize which cues were 
the most successful. Thus, the procedure used in Study 2, by providing all the participants 
with a same cue box, unbiased them: Children were no longer biased toward perceptual cues, 
and young adults were no longer biased toward technical cues. Although this may result in an 
improvement for young adults, who are able to identify in a set of given cues those that are 
the most successful, it might be disadvantageous for children, who lose the advantage the 
“perceptual bias” gives them in some tasks without being able to compensate for the loss. In 
this first exploration of cue generation, though, a question our two studies cannot answer is 
whether the children and young adults in Study 1 generated the best cues they could, or the 
only ones they had available in their cue box. Moreover, if the children’s perceptual bias has 
been already thoroughly investigated, both as limit and advantage (John & Sujan, 1990; 
Springer, 2001), future research should investigate and test further the bias towards technical 
cues.  
Finally, we find the generation paradigm a stimulating and promising methodology.  
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From a perspective of ecological rationality (Todd, Gigerenzer and the ABC Research 
Group, 2012), we believe that generating cues from scratch, more then choosing them from a 
catalogue, can be a crucial step in studying cue-based decision making and, in general, the 
process of searching for information that actually takes place when people make choices and 
decisions, assess preferences, generate hypotheses, and trace causes (see Mosher & Hornsby, 
1966).  
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Abstract 
In this paper we open children’s and young adults’ cuebox, the set of the cues people 
have available for making an inference. We explore the importance of cues beyond content 
free representations, by examining the cues participants generate for a range of everyday 
inference tasks. Further, we investigate how objective informativeness of a cue and type of 
cue determine children’s and young adult’s ability to generate the most informative cue in 
their cuebox and to select the most informative between two given cues. Results show that 
children’s cuebox contains more perceptual cues than young adults’. However, we found no 
difference between the two age groups in terms of informativeness of the cues generated. 
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Young adults showed the tendency to systematically consider non-perceptual cues more 
informative than visible cues, whereas children showed the same tendency only in a cue-
selection task.  
Introduction 
What do we know about the cues children and adults use for making an inference, 
such as “which of two cars is more expensive”? Not much. The tasks and methods used by 
researchers on cue-base decision-making are well suited to investigate the research questions 
they address (e.g., what strategies people use when searching for information). However, 
there are at least three reasons why the same tasks and methods are less suited 
to investigate what type of cues people use for making an inference. Consider the following 
example, based on the literature (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006): 
Imagine you are a geologist. You have to choose the most profitable out of three oil-
drilling sites, on the basis of some test results. You can conduct six different tests (chemical 
analysis, geophones, gravimetry, ground water analysis, microscopic analysis, and seismic 
analysis), by clicking on corresponding icons on the computer screen, in a MouseLab-like 
task (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Each test has two possible outcomes (e.g., 
low/high, or strong/weak), one of them indicating more oil.  
First, as in this example, cue-based decision-making research typically investigates 
the process of searching for information by using a cue-selection design. People have to 
select from among a set of available cues to get hints about the right inference to make. Pre-
selecting the cues participants can consult for making inferences in an experimental setting, 
however, severely limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the cues people would 
spontaneously use for real-world inferences. Second, this line of research often tries to isolate 
the structure of the information of a certain decision problem, by handling the cue as a mere 
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value, empty of content, often further reducing it to dichotomous values such as “low” and 
“high”. Third, researchers use tasks with cover stories that minimize reliance on real-world 
knowledge as in the oil-drilling task, presenting a situation likely unfamiliar to most 
participants (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group, 
1999; Rakow, Newell, Fayers, & Hersby, 2005; Mata, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011; 
but see Pachur, Bröder, & Marewski, 2008, for an exception). In this way, they aim at ruling 
out from the experimental design the experience people have with particular cues, the 
preferences they might have for some types of cues, and their intuition about the 
informativeness of a cue for an inference task 
In this paper we open children’s and young adults’ cuebox, which we define as the set 
of the cues people have available for making an inference. We explore the importance of 
cues beyond the content-free representations, by examining the cues participants generate for 
a range of everyday inference tasks. Further, we investigate how objective informativeness of 
a cue and type of cue determine children’s and young adult’s ability to select the most 
informative cue available. 
Because knowledge of cues develops across the life-span, we expect that children and 
young adults generate, and use, different types of cues. Presumably, children have less 
experience and knowledge than young adults. Thus, they will generate less cues than young 
adults. Moreover, we expect children, often described as “perceptually oriented” or 
“perceptually bound” (Flavell, 1985; John & Sujan, 1990; Springer, 2001; Wartella, 1979), to 
generate more perceptual cues than young adults. Perceptual cues refer to visible and 
countable features of the objects (such as the length of a car), whereas non-perceptual cues 
refer to the more underlying, potentially technical, features and structures of the objects (such 
as horsepower of a car). 
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Cues are not good or bad per se, but their efficacy depends on the inference task in 
which they are used. In some inference tasks, perceptual cues are more informative than non-
perceptual cues, whereas in other inference tasks the opposite is true. For example, in the car-
price inference task used by Ruggeri and Katsikopoulos (2012), non-perceptual cues (e.g., 
horsepower) were more informative than perceptual cues (e.g., length), whereas in the city-
population task (i.e., which of two cities is more populous) perceptual cues (e.g., number of 
hotels) were more informative than non-perceptual cues (e.g., density of population). An 
intriguing possibility, then, is that children might actually generate more informative cues 
than adults for some inference tasks. 
Study 1 explores the content of the cuebox by asking participants to generate and list 
all the cues they think could be relevant in 12 different inferences problems (for example, 
which of two cars is faster). Study 2 and 3 investigate whether children and adults can select 
the most informative cue available, and how the type of the cues—perceptual or non-
perceptual—influences the selection process. Study 2 approaches this question by asking 
children and young adults to generate what they deem as the most informative cue for the 
same 12 inference tasks. Study 3 tackles the question by asking participants to select between 
two cues the one they think is more informative, for two different inference tasks. 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we expected children to have fewer cues available in their cuebox–
therefore, to generate fewer cues–than young adults, because they have less experience and 
knowledge. Because we hypothesized that children generate more perceptual cues than 
young adults, they may have an advantage in some inference tasks, but not in others. Thus, 
overall, children may have in their cuebox cues that are just as informative as the ones young 
adults have. 
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Method 
Participants. Participants in Study 1 were 47 children in the 4th and 5th grade (22 
females, Mage = 9.3; SD = 0.62) and 51 young adults (44 females, Mage = 17.4; SD = 0.83) 
from two schools in Livorno, Italy.8 The students were all Italian and belonging to various 
social classes.  
Design and procedure. The experimental session consisted of a paper and pencil 
questionnaire, collectively administrated in class, composed of eight questions presented on 
separate sheets, all describing similar problems, such as: “There are two cars, Car 1 and Car 
2, both currently produced by FIAT. Let’s suppose you have to guess which of these two cars 
is faster. What would you like to ask about them before making the decision?” For each 
inference, participants had five minutes to generate all the cues they could think of that could 
help them making that inference. At the end of the five minutes, participants were asked to 
move on to the next problem.  
We had 12 problems in total, that differ in terms of the objects presented and the 
inference participants were asked to generate cues about (see Table 1). The problems were 
randomly assigned to the participants and presented in random order. Participants were 
repeatedly prompted to generate as many cues as they could and they were told that all the 
students completing the tasks ‘to the best of their abilities’ would be rewarded with a prize – 





8 The primary school “Istituto Sacro Cuore” and the high school “F. Cecioni” 
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Table 1 
The inference tasks presented to the participants in Study 1 and 2 
Abbreviation Inference Task 
City population Which of these two cities is more populous? 
Car price Which of these two cars is more expensive? 
Mobile price Which of these two mobile phones is more expensive? 
Actor earn Which of these two actors earned more money last year? 
Team results Which of these two soccer teams will win the match? 
Movie earn Which of these two movies gained more money? 
Player earn Which of these two soccer players gains more money per month? 
Animal speed Which of these two animals is faster? 
City temperature Which of these two cities have on average the higher temperature? 
Car speed Which of these two cars is faster? 
House price Which of these two houses in Ardenza9 is more expensive? 
Book sales Which of these two books sold more copies? 
 
Results 
Number of cues. In total, participants in Study 1 generated 3962 cues. Children 
generated on average 6.1 cues per trial (SD = 2.7), whereas young adults generated on 
average 4.5 cues per trial (SD = 1.8). From all the cues generated, we subsequently excluded: 
(a) the subjective cues, that is, cues which values (and therefore efficacy) could not be 
objectively assessed, such as “is the actor beautiful?”; (b) the cues which values were not 
assessable, such as “did one of the teams bribe the referee?”; and (c) the redundant cues, 
where the same participants asked the same information many times in different ways (for 
example, “are they heavy?” and “which one is heavier?”). Almost half of the cues were 
eliminated through this filtering, that left 2000 cues to be analyzed.  
Because often participants did not generate any valid cue for a given inference task, we 
																																																								
	
9 A neighborhood of Livorno 
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used a Mixed Models analysis that allowed all the available data to be considered. A Mixed 
Models analysis with inference task as repeated measure, and fixed effects age group and 
inference task showed a main effect of age group, F(1,89) = 7.9, p = .006: Children generated 
more cues per trial than young adults (Mchildren = 2.8; SD = 1.9; Myoung_adults = 2.44; SD = 1.5). 
We also found a main effect of the inference task, F(11,60) = 42.2, p < .001: For some 
inferences (for example, which of two houses is more expensive) participants generated more 
cues (M = 5.5; SD = 1.8) than for others (for example, which of two animals is faster, M = 
1.22; SD = 0.9). The number of cues generated by the participants in the different inference 
tasks is shown in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
Type of cues. We asked 4 adults, blind to the experimental hypotheses and to the 
tasks, to categorize all the cues generated as perceptual or non-perceptual. The reliance 
among the results of these 4 independent categorizations resulted to be very strong 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85). The cues together with the final categorization are shown in Table 
A2.  
As expected, we found that overall, 53% of the cues generated by children are 
perceptual, whereas only 34% of the cues generated by young adults are perceptual. Children 
generated in every inference task a higher percentage of perceptual cues than young adults. 
For some inferences this difference is strong (Table A3). For example in the tasks “which of 
these two cars is more expensive” (Children: 62%; Young adults: 28%) and “which of these 
two cars is faster” (Children: 50%; Young adults: 8%). 
Quality of the cues. The quality of the generated cues was measured in terms of 
success (Newell, Rakow, Weston & Shanks, 2004). The success of a cue in an inference task 
is the probability, in that particular inference task, that the cue will lead to a correct inference. 
For the calculation of success, it is assumed that if the cue has a higher value on one of the 
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two objects, then this object will be picked, and if the cue has the same value on both objects, 
then an object will be picked randomly.  
We ran a Mixed Models analysis with inference task as repeated measure and fixed 
effects age group and inference task. We found that, as hypothesized, the overall quality of 
the cues generated by the two age groups does not significantly differ (Mchildren = 0.65; SD = 
0.09; Myoung_adults = 0.65; SD = 0.09). As for the number of questions generated, we also 
found a main effect of inference task on the quality of the cues, F(11,31) = 263.7, p < .001: 
For some inferences participants generated more successful cues (e.g., which of two cars is 
faster, M = 0.76; SD = 0.08) than for others (e.g., which of two actors earned more last year, 
M = 0.54; SD = 0.02). We also found an interaction effect between age group and inference 
task, F(11,31) = 9.6, p = .03: For some inferences children generated more successful cues 
than young adults (e.g., which of two cities is more populous, Mchildren = 0.75; SD = 0.08; 
Myoung_adults = 0.64; SD = 0.08), whereas in others young adults’ cues were more successful 
(e.g., which of two cars is faster, Mchildren = 0.72; SD = 0.05; Myoung_adults = 0.8; SD = 0.07). 
The means related to the quality of the cues generated in each inference task by age group are 
shown in Table A4. 
Discussion 
We found that, surprisingly, children have more cues available in their cuebox, for all 
the inference tasks we tested, even after filtering the many subjective and not-assessable cues 
they generated. How is it possible, considering they have less experience and general 
knowledge than young adults? Our explanation is that children interpreted the inference tasks 
in Study 1 as free association problems, of the kind “tell me any feature you can recall related 
to this type of object (for example, to cars)”. Indeed, children did not seem to have any strong 
a-priori filter, and they did not try too hard to separate the relevant and useful cues from the 
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others. Another possible explanation is that children seemed to perceive more freely and to 
have fewer assumptions and expectations about what should be asked, because they are less 
bound to cues that become stereotypes or appropriate only through experience. 
Children, as expected, generated a higher percentage of perceptual cues than young 
adults, for all inference tasks.  
We found no difference between the two age groups in terms of quality of the cues 
generated. As in Ruggeri and Katsikopoulos (2012), in some inference tasks (as in the city-
population task) perceptual cues happen to be more successful than non-perceptual cues, 
whereas in other inference tasks (as the car-price task) the opposite is true. In many other 
tasks (as in the mobile phone-price task), perceptual and non-perceptual cues are equally 
successful. Thus, being biased towards perceptual cues, as children are, can be both an 
advantage or a disadvantage in different inference tasks, according to an ecological 
rationality perspective (Todd, Gigerenzer & the ABC Research Group, 2012; Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2007). 
Knowing what is in people’s cuebox does not tell us anything about which of the cues 
available they consider as the most informative. Study 2 and 3 investigate whether children 
and young adults can identify the most informative cue, when generating cues from their 
cuebox (Study 2) or when selecting between two given cues (Study 3). Moreover, in both 
studies we examine how the type of cues (i.e., perceptual or not-perceptual) influences the 
process of generation/selection.  
Study 2 
Consistently with the results of Study 1, in Study 2 we expected children to generate 
overall more perceptual cues than adults, who would generate more non-perceptual cues. 
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We assumed that, through experience, young adults are more familiar with the cues 
they have in their cuebox than children are. They should therefore be able to rank the 
efficiency of their own cues more accurately than children. Thus, we hypothesized young 
adults to generate more informative cues than children. 
Method 
Participants. Participants in Study 2 were 50 children in the 4th and 5th grade (26 
females, Mage = 10.1; SD = 0.27) and 33 young adults (15 females, Mage = 17.6; SD = 0.86) 
from two schools in Livorno, Italy.10 The students were all Italian and belonging to various 
social classes.  
Design. In Study 2 participants were presented with a paper-and-pencil questionnaire 
collectively administrated in class. The questionnaire consisted of the same 12 inference 
tasks of Study 1 (see Table 1), presented in random order. Children and young adults were 
asked to generate only the cue they consider the most helpful in making the inference. They 
were given five minutes for each inference task. 
We told the participants that the child and young adult generating the overall most 
successful cues, defined as the cues that would be most predictive of the correct inference, 
would be awarded with a 25-euro Amazon gift card. 
Results 
Type of cues. As in Study 1, children always generated more perceptual cues than 
adults (Children: 45%; Young adults: 26%), with strong differences between the inference 
tasks (see Table A5).   
																																																								
	
10 The primary school “Santa Maria Maddalena” and the high school “F. Enriques” 
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Quality of the cues. We ran a Mixed Models analysis with inference task as repeated 
measure and fixed effects age group and inference task, and we found no main effect of the 
age group, but an effect of the inference task, F(11,92) = 278.8; p < .001. For some 
inferences participants generated more successful cues (e.g., which of two cities has the 
highest average temperature, M = 0.85; SD = 0.06) than for others (e.g., which of two actors 
earned more last year, M = 0.51; SD = 0.07). Table A6 shows the average success of the cues 
generated by participants in the two age groups, for each inference task. 
Discussion 
As expected, we found that children generated overall more perceptual cues than 
young adults, who generated more non-perceptual cues.  
Surprisingly, we found again no differences between children and young adults in 
terms of overall success of the cues generated. Even though young adults should be better 
than children at selecting the most informative cues from their cuebox due to their 
experience, they tend to generate non-perceptual cues even when they are less informative 
than perceptual cues. We interpret this behavior as indicative of a bias towards non-
perceptual cues. 
Study 3 
In Study 3 we assumed young adults to be more experienced and familiar than 
children with the given cues. Thus, we expected that young adults would be better then 
children at selecting the most informative between the two cues, independently on their type. 
On the contrary, children might be able to select the most informative cue only when both the 
given cues are perceptual.  
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Method 
Participants. Participants in Study 3 were 37 children in the 4th and 5th grade (20 
females, Mage = 9.76; SD = 0.60) and 18 young adults (8 females, Mage = 17.22; SD = 0.43) 
from four schools in Livorno, Italy.11 The students were all Italian and belonging to various 
social classes.  
Design. Study 3 consisted of a computer experiment of 12 trials, presented in random 
order. In each trial, participants were presented with an inference task and had to select 
between two given cues the one they wanted to consult before making the inference. 
Table 2 
Cues Used in Study 3, and Their Success 
Mobile price 
 High Success Low Success 
 Cue Success Cue Success 
Non-perceptual Memory 0.89 Battery Length 0.52 
Perceptual Thickness 0.82 Camera 0.55 
Car price 
 High Success Low Success 
 Cue Success Cue Success 
Non-perceptual Capacity 0.76 Fuel Consumption 0.52 
Perceptual Length 0.77 Doors 0.63 
 
There were two possible inferences: Which of two mobile phones is more expensive, 
and which of two cars is more expensive. Each inference was presented to the participants in 
6 trials. In each trial, participants received one of the 6 possible different combinations of 2 
cues taken from a set of 4 cues: A perceptual/high success cue (PH), a non-perceptual/high 
																																																								
	
11 The primary schools “Fondazione Sacro Cuore”, “Fondazione San Carlo Borromeo” and “Istituto Beata Rosa 
Venerini”, and the high school “F. Enriques” 
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success cue (NH), a perceptual/low success cue (PL) and a non-perceptual/low success (NL) 
cue. Table 2 shows a list of the cues used for Study 3. We chose these two inferences, among 
the 12 used in the other two studies, because they satisfied two crucial conditions: (1) among 
the cues generated for these inferences in Study 1 we found examples of all the four cue 
categories mentioned above and (2) we could find two pairs of high success and low success 
cues which success was similar (see Table 2). 
There was no time limit for completing the session. Participants were told that the child 
and young adult with the highest number of accurate inferences would be awarded with a 20-
euro Amazon gift card. 
Results 
Two Repeated Measure ANOVAs, one for success and one for visibility, with 
inference task and trials as within-subject factors, and age group as between subject variable, 
revealed no difference between the two inference tasks. Thus, the data related to the two 
inference tasks are presented together. Figure 1A and Figure 1B show the percentages of 
children and young adults who selected respectively a high success cue and a perceptual cue, 
for the trials specified on the x-axis.  
As we can observe, in trials where participants were given a perceptual/high success 
cue (PH) and a non-perceptual/high success cue (NH), both children and young adults 
selected only few times the perceptual cue (Children: 16%; Young adults: 28%). In the trials 
where participants were given a perceptual/low success (PL) cue or a non-perceptual/low 
success cue (NL), children again selected only few times the perceptual one (Children: 16%), 
whereas young adults selected the perceptual cue 52% of the times. In trials where 
participants were given a perceptual/high success cue (PH) or a perceptual/low success cue 
(PL), children selected the high success one slightly more often (58%) than young adults 
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(42%). In trials where participants were given a non-perceptual/high success cue (NH) or a 
non-perceptual/low success cue (NL), they selected more often the high success one 
(Children: 62%; Young adults: 86%). 
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of children and young adults who selected a high success cue (Figure 1A) and a 
perceptual cue (Figure 1B), in the trials specified in the x axis. Bars indicate standard errors. 
 
In trials where participants were given a perceptual/low success cue (PL) and a non-
perceptual/high success cue (NH), they select more often the non-perceptual/high success 
one (Children: 78%; Young adults: 89%). Finally, in what we reckon as the crucial trial, 
where participants were given a perceptual/high success cue (PH) and a non-perceptual/low 
success cue (NL), children selected more often the non-perceptual/low success cue (73%), 
and young adults selected the perceptual/high success cue in only 52% of the trials.  
Discussion 
A B 
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In Study 3 we found that when participants were given a perceptual and a non-
perceptual cue, both being high or low success, they selected more often the non-perceptual 
one, especially the children. We also found that, in trials where the two cues presented were 
both perceptual or non-perceptual, the participants could not always identify the most 
successful one. In particular, it seemed to be hard for them to identify the most successful 
between two perceptual cues. This was especially true for the young adults, who maybe use 
these cues less often and are therefore less familiar with them.  
In what we defined as the crucial trials, where participants had to trade between 
visibility and success, children selected the non-perceptual/low success cue more often, and 
adults selected the perceptual/high success cue only about half times. 
These results suggest that the bias towards non-perceptual cues, observed in Study 2, 
is present also in a cue-selection design. Here, also children, besides the young adults, tend to 
select non-perceptual cues, assuming that they are more informative than perceptual cues.  
General Discussion 
In this paper we wanted to explore, from a developmental perspective, the interaction 
between the knowledge of cues useful for an inference, the type of cues and the ability to 
select the most informative cue available. To do so, we opened and compared children’s and 
young adults’ cuebox, by examining the amount, type and informativeness of the cues people 
have available, potentially, for making different kind of inferences (Study 1). Moreover, we 
tested whether children and adults can select the most informative cue available, and how this 
is influenced by the type of cues, in both a cue-generation (Study 2) and a traditional cue-
selection (Study 3) task.  
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We found that children have in their cuebox more perceptual cues then adults. This 
fits with the definition of children as “perceptually oriented” (Flavell, 1985; John & Sujan, 
1990; Springer, 2001; Wartella, 1979). Children have overall less knowledge and less 
experience of the objects and of their non-perceptual features. As they grow up, the process 
of updating their knowledge through experience leads also to an update of their cuebox: 
Some of the perceptual cues children used to base their inferences on are replaced by non-
perceptual cues, assumed to be more appropriate, sophisticated and technical - thus more 
informative, as seen in Study 2. There is the rub: The informativeness of a cue is not a fixed 
feature, but it reflects a match between the cue and the task at hand. Therefore, in some 
inference tasks those non-perceptual cues, though more appropriate and sophisticated, are not 
more informative than perceptual cues. In these inference tasks, in a cue-generation design, 
children have an advantage, because they tend to generate perceptual cues (Study 2). 
In a cue-selection design (Study 3), though, both adults and children show a bias, a 
tendency to deem non-perceptual cues as more informative than perceptual cues, even when 
they are not. Evidently, being presented with something that ‘looks and sounds’ more 
appropriate and sophisticated is enough for triggering this bias.  
Our findings open the way and suggest further investigations, especially exploring the 
bias towards non-perceptual cues and testing possible interventions to make people aware of 
the situations where such tendency is not useful, learning from children. 
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Study 1: Mean Number (and Standard Deviations) of Cues Generated by the Participants, 
Listed by Inference Task 
  
Inference task Children SD Young adults SD Mean SD 
City population 3.25 1.36 1.86 0.96 2.42 1.32 
Car price 4.45 1.86 2.52 1.29 3.52 1.87 
Mobile price 3.74 1.65 3.19 1.47 3.44 1.57 
Actor earn 1.71 0.97 2.39 0.93 2.07 1.01 
Team results 1.94 1.04 2.04 1.04 1.98 1.03 
Movie earn 1.86 1.00 2.06 1.12 1.96 1.06 
Player earn 1.63 1.25 2.21 1.22 1.94 1.26 
Animal speed 1.36 0.99 1.10 0.89 1.22 0.94 
City temperature 2.68 1.59 2.71 0.93 2.70 1.25 
Car speed 3.76 2.01 2.50 1.27 3.00 1.70 
House price 5.61 1.69 5.33 1.95 5.48 1.81 
Book sales 1.69 1.05 1.30 0.95 1.51 1.02 
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Table A2: 
Study 1: Cues (and their Type) Generated by Participants (Percentages Within Age Group), 
Listed by Inference Task 
Inference task Question Type Adults Children 
City population 
Airport Non-perceptual 4 4 
Altitude Perceptual 2 10 
Area Perceptual 41 36 
Capital Non-perceptual 6 2 
Climate Non-perceptual 18 2 
Density od Population Non-perceptual 6 2 
Number of buildings Perceptual 6 38 
Number of hotels Perceptual 0 4 
Number of parks Perceptual 2 21 
Number of restaurants Perceptual 0 4 
Number of schools Perceptual 8 15 
Number of 
monuments 
Perceptual 12 6 
Number of Museums Perceptual 2 4 
Seismic Risk Non-perceptual 6 0 
Stadiums Perceptual 0 2 
Tourism Non-perceptual 10 11 
Train Stations Perceptual 4 4 
Unemployment Non-perceptual 12 11 
Car price 
AC Non-perceptual 4 4 
Capacity Non-perceptual 2 17 
Cylinders Non-perceptual 20 13 
Doors Perceptual 12 9 
Fuel consumption Non-perceptual 0 9 
Gears Perceptual 8 19 
Horsepower Non-perceptual 43 49 
Length Perceptual 0 23 
Parking Sensors Perceptual 2 2 
Pollution level Perceptual 2 0 
Seats Perceptual 16 32 
Size Perceptual 18 43 
Size of the trunk Perceptual 2 17 
Speed Non-perceptual 12 40 
Type of fuel Non-perceptual 14 28 
Weight Non-perceptual 2 2 
Width Perceptual 0 11 
Mobile price 
Battery life Non-perceptual 6 21 
Bluetooth Non-perceptual 18 2 
Camera Perceptual 51 38 
Dual sim Perceptual 8 4 
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Email Perceptual 2 0 
Facebook Non-perceptual 0 4 
Games Perceptual 0 21 
GPS Perceptual 4 0 
Internet Perceptual 29 23 
Length Perceptual 2 23 
Memory Non-perceptual 41 23 
Screen resolution Perceptual 6 11 
Screen size Perceptual 4 13 
Size Perceptual 4 9 
Thickness Perceptual 2 4 
Touchpad Perceptual 39 66 
Weight Non-perceptual 0 4 
Width Perceptual 0 2 
Wifi Non-perceptual 12 2 
Years on the market Non-perceptual 29 11 
Youtube Non-perceptual 0 2 
Actor earn 
Age Non-perceptual 12 30 
Awards Non-perceptual 25 6 
Director Non-perceptual 14 0 
Height Perceptual 0 9 
Role Non-perceptual 37 19 
TV series Perceptual 14 11 
Years of Experience Non-perceptual 114 66 
Team results 
Age Non-perceptual 12 6 
Awards Non-perceptual 10 15 
Fans Perceptual 6 11 
Injured Non-perceptual 14 4 
Number of players Perceptual 57 83 
Size of the stadium Perceptual 0 2 
Team ranking Non-perceptual 47 66 
Movie earn 
3D Perceptual 10 19 
Awards Non-perceptual 27 9 
Book Non-perceptual 6 2 
Length Perceptual 6 34 
Number of actors Perceptual 65 46 
Production costs Non-perceptual 8 17 
Ranking Non-perceptual 2 2 
Sequel Non-perceptual 4 6 
Special effects Non-perceptual 6 0 
Trailers Non-perceptual 2 6 
Translations Non-perceptual 10 2 
Player earn 
Age Non-perceptual 29 13 
Awards Non-perceptual 10 6 
Captain Non-perceptual 4 9 
Height Perceptual 0 2 
Nationality Non-perceptual 2 4 
Position Non-perceptual 29 57 
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Team ranking Non-perceptual 35 26 
Years of experience Non-perceptual 51 19 
Animal speed 
Average age Non-perceptual 8 15 
Height Perceptual 4 6 
Herd Non-perceptual 4 6 
Length Perceptual 0 11 
Number of legs Perceptual 27 28 
Size Perceptual 0 2 
Strength Non-perceptual 2 2 
Weight Non-perceptual 2 2 
City temperature 
Altitude Perceptual 24 23 
Area Non-perceptual 10 21 
Cm of snow per year Non-perceptual 0 2 
Cm rain per year Perceptual 2 6 
Coast Perceptual 51 30 
Humidity Non-perceptual 10 6 
Island Perceptual 2 4 
Latitude Non-perceptual 71 57 
Northern Italy Non-perceptual 14 17 
Population Non-perceptual 6 17 
Tourism Non-perceptual 4 9 
Car speed 
Acceleration Non-perceptual 4 0 
Capacity Non-perceptual 22 13 
Cylinders Non-perceptual 29 17 
Doors Perceptual 0 4 
Fuel consumption Non-perceptual 4 2 
Gears Perceptual 2 13 
Height Perceptual 0 11 
Horsepower Non-perceptual 59 23 
Length Perceptual 0 17 
Price Non-perceptual 16 15 
Seats Perceptual 6 19 
Size Perceptual 10 23 
Size of trunk Perceptual 2 9 
Tank capacity Non-perceptual 0 2 
Type of fuel Non-perceptual 25 15 
Weight Non-perceptual 16 11 
Width Perceptual 0 11 
House price 
Area Perceptual 49 87 
Attic Perceptual 4 4 
Condo expenses Perceptual 14 17 
Elevator Non-perceptual 0 2 
Fireplace Perceptual 2 9 
Furniture Perceptual 20 23 
Garage Perceptual 24 17 
Garden Perceptual 45 47 
Height Perceptual 33 51 
Kind of floor Non-perceptual 0 6 




















Length Perceptual 0 4 
Light Perceptual 6 19 
Number of rooms Perceptual 37 64 
Pool Perceptual 6 13 
Renewed Non-perceptual 45 28 
Terrace Perceptual 12 19 
View on the sea Non-perceptual 18 30 
Width Perceptual 0 4 
Book sales 
Author’s other books Non-perceptual 8 9 
Awards Non-perceptual 6 0 
Illustrations Perceptual 2 15 
Length Perceptual 31 91 
Movie Non-perceptual 4 4 
Nationality Non-perceptual 2 9 
Price Non-perceptual 16 23 
Ranking Non-perceptual 6 0 
Sequel Non-perceptual 4 0 
Width Perceptual 0 4 
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Table A3 
Study 1: Percentages of Perceptual Cues on The Total Amount of Cues Generated, Listed by 
Inference Task 
Inference task Children SD Young adults SD Mean SD 
City population 79 26 66 51 71 42 
Car price 62 24 28 25 45 30 
Mobile price 62 27 41 33 51 32 
Actor earn 9 18 1 6 4 13 
Team results 31 16 35 21 33 18 
Movie earn 54 29 30 31 41 32 
Player earn 11 20 2 9 6 15 
Animal speed 63 32 56 45 60 38 
City temperature 70 44 44 33 55 40 
Car speed 50 28 8 14 26 29 
House price 76 29 68 25 72 27 
Book sales 56 29 31 27 45 31 
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Table A4 
Study 1: Mean Success (and Standard Deviations) of the Cues Generated by the Participants, 
Listed by Inference Task  
Inference task Children SD Young adults SD Mean SD 
City population 0.75 0.08 0.65 0.08 0.69 0.09 
Car price 0.73 0.03 0.75 0.04 0.74 0.03 
Mobile price 0.69 0.06 0.68 0.08 0.68 0.07 
Actor earn 0.54 0.03 0.53 0.02 0.54 0.03 
Team results 0.70 0.10 0.69 0.08 0.70 0.09 
Movie earn 0.60 0.03 0.58 0.02 0.59 0.03 
Player earn 0.57 0.02 0.57 0.02 0.57 0.02 
Animal speed 0.59 0.04 0.61 0.03 0.60 0.04 
City temperature 0.66 0.08 0.71 0.05 0.69 0.07 
Car speed 0.72 0.06 0.80 0.07 0.77 0.08 
House price 0.66 0.05 0.66 0.05 0.66 0.05 
Book sales 0.58 0.03 0.58 0.03 0.58 0.03 
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Table A5  
Study 2: Percentages of Perceptual Cues on The Total Amount of Cues Generated, Listed by 
Inference Task 
Inference task Children SD Young adults SD Mean SD 
City population  38  49  35  49  37  49 
Car price  56  50  15  37  43  50 
Mobile price  76  44  63  50  71  46 
Actor earn  00  00  04  20  02  13 
Team results  29  47  00  00  14  35 
Movie earn  73  46  07  27  41  50 
Player earn  05  22  00  00  03  17 
Animal speed  57  51  20  45  47  51 
City temperature  12  33  08  28  10  32 
Car speed  32  48  00  00  17  38 
House price  98  15  96  20  97  17 
Book sales  54  41  23  42  39  41 
Mean  45  50  26  44  37  48 
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Table A6 
Study 2: Mean Success (and Standard Deviations) of the Cues Generated by the Participants, 








Inference task Children SD Young adults SD Mean SD 
City population 0.70 0.22 0.68 0.23 0.69 0.22 
Car price 0.58 0.34 0.58 0.35 0.58 0.34 
Mobile price 0.70 0.17 0.72 0.05 0.70 0.14 
Actor earn 0.52 0.00 0.50 0.11 0.51 0.07 
Team results 0.68 0.20 0.80 0.03 0.74 0.15 
Movie earn 0.60 0.01 0.59 0.01 0.59 0.01 
Player earn 0.55 0.03 0.55 0.04 0.55 0.03 
Animal speed 0.62 0.03 0.62 0.05 0.62 0.04 
City temperature 0.85 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.85 0.06 
Car speed 0.81 0.12 0.82 0.16 0.82 0.14 
House price 0.76 0.10 0.79 0.07 0.77 0.09 
Book sales 0.62 0.07 0.54 0.05 0.58 0.06 




















This dissertation pioneers the exploration of people’s intuitions about the importance 
of real cues in the real world and how those intuitions develop over the lifespan. We 
investigated if, and under which conditions, children and adults search and implement the 
most effective piece of information when categorizing (Chapter 2) or making inferences 
(Chapters 3 and 4).   
My research makes three major contributions to psychology and cue-based decision-
making. First, the results of Chapter 2 indicate the representation of objects can influence the 
efficacy of children’s inquiring strategies; Different representations trigger different types of 
features. Specifically, the basic level of objects’ representation facilitated children in 
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generating questions based on higher-order features. Such features distinguish the objects 
within a same superordinate category and can therefore be used to ask effective questions. 
When children did not generate features to ask questions but instead selected among a set of 
given questions, the effect of domain and level of representation did not emerge. However, 
the developmental differences between younger children, older children and adults in 
identifying the most efficient questions from a given set remained. 
As already mentioned in the conclusions of Chapter 2, the analysis of people’s 
inquiring strategies in a sequential binary categorization task should be extended to situations 
where the set of potential alternatives is not given. In our everyday life there is rarely a well-
defined set of alternatives, a catalogue to select among. Therefore, this design would be an 
extension to more ecological settings of the investigation presented in Chapter 2. Moreover, 
it could be used to explore how people dynamically construct and update the set of possible 
alternatives. Further, this investigation would allow us to examine at which level of 
abstraction and representation children and adults naturally think when building a set of 
alternatives from scratch.  
Second, the results of Chapter 3 and 4 show that the cues children and young adults 
have in their cuebox differ, particularly in terms of type: Children have more perceptual cues 
and young adults have more non-perceptual cues. Despite this difference, across the tested 
inference tasks, we found no difference between the two age groups in terms of quality of the 
cues generated. Results of Chapter 4 also show that, surprisingly, children have more cues 
than young adults available in their cuebox, for all the inference tasks we tested. Moreover, 
we found that the type of cue influences children and adults’ intuitions about its 
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informativeness in a cue-selection design: The non-perceptual cues were considered more 
informative then perceptual ones. 
These findings call for further investigations. First, the robustness of what we defined 
as a bias towards non-perceptual cues should be tested in other inference tasks and in other 
kinds of decision making situations, for example when choosing among consumer products. 
Second, it would be crucial to understand more precisely, from a developmental perspective, 
when and how children let go of the perceptual cues and start to fill their cuebox with non-
perceptual cues. This could be done, for example, by monitoring this transition in a 
longitudinal study. Both these lines of research might also test and inform the design of 
possible interventions aimed at making children and adults aware of the situations where 
such tendency is detrimental. In this way, research could help them tune their cuebox to make 
it adaptive (Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Research Group 1999).  
Third, the experimental design matters. In all three experimental papers composing 
this dissertation we compared two methodologies: A cue-generation paradigm, where 
children and adults are free to generate the cues they consider most relevant for the task at 
hand, and a cue-selection paradigm, where participants are asked to select among a set of 
given cues the ones they want to consult. We found substantial and interesting differences 
between these two methodologies. On the one hand, the effects of object domain and 
representation of (i.e., the facilitating effect of the basic-level condition, as well as the 
hindering effect of the subordinate-level and features-enriched conditions) emerge only in a 
cue-generation design. On the other hand, in a cue-generation design children have an 
advantage in the inference tasks for which the perceptual cues happen to be more 
informative.  This advantage is lost in a cue-selection paradigm. 
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Even though the cue-selection paradigm is the one traditionally used to study cue-
based decision-making, we argue that in many real world situations people are not provided 
with a set of cues they can look up. For this reason, I think that investigating further the 
process of generating cues is crucial to understanding the process that actually takes place 
when people search for information. In the next years, I plan to extend the cue-generation 
methodology I adopted in this dissertation. In particular, I started investigating the process of 
searching and identifying relevant cues when: a) tracing causes and generating hypotheses 
for an observed event (Ruggeri & Katsikopoulos, 2012; Ruggeri & Lombrozo, 2012); b) 
assessing own and other’s preferences, such as for medical treatments or consumer products; 
c) assessing own and other’s conditions (e.g., health condition or financial condition) and 
related risks. A nuanced understanding of how children and adults perceive the importance of 
environmental cues in different situations might be crucial to design better and more 
thoughtful interventions and intuitive communication strategies. 
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